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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO  CIVDS 1504326	
ACLU OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,  Petitioner,  v.  SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,  Defendant.	Case No.  VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE DIRECTED TO THE SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT ORDERING COMPLIANCE WITH THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RECORDS ACT  [Gov't Code §§ 6250 et seq.]
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ACLU of Southern California (the "ACLU") petitions this Court for a writ of mandate directed to the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department (the "Sheriff's Department"), commanding the Sheriff's Department to comply with the California Public Records Act ("CPRA"). The ACLU brings this petition under sections 1085 *et seq.* of the Code of Civil Procedure and sections 6250 *et seq.* of the Government Code. By this verified Petition, the ACLU alleges:

# INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

- 1. Electronic control devices, commonly known as "Tasers," are weapons that deploy an electrical current to disrupt voluntary muscle control and cause neuromuscular incapacitation. Tasers shoot probes that deliver a debilitating electrical charge to targeted individuals. Tasers may also be used in a "Drive-Stun" mode to inflict severe pain. San Bernardino County Sheriff's deputies use Tasers, with and without "Drive-Stun" mode, in the field and in county jails.
- 2. In 2012, the San Bernardino County Civil Grand Jury (the "Grand Jury") formed an Ad Hoc Committee to examine the Sheriff's Department's policies on the use of Tasers, in response to a pattern of deaths occurring nationwide and specifically in San Bernardino County following the deployment of Tasers by law enforcement officers.
- 3. The Grand Jury reviewed the Sheriff's Department's Taser training and policy manuals, as well as "data on [T]aser usage within the scope of use of force instances" that were provided to the committee by the Sheriff's Department, and published a "Final Report" containing its findings and recommendations regarding the Sheriff's Department's Taser policies and use.
- 4. In the Final Report, the Grand Jury observed: "Taser related deaths are not uncommon in San Bernardino County."
- 5. In one case described by the Grand Jury, a Lake Arrowhead man died after three Sheriff's Department deputies shot him with their Tasers 16 times. News accounts of the incident made clear the man was unarmed, and had been stopped by deputies for allegedly running a stop sign.
- 6. In another case described by the Grand Jury, an Apple Valley man died after Sheriff's deputies shot him with their Tasers three times. Yet another man died in custody at West

Valley Detention Center after Sheriff's deputies there shot him with their Tasers two times.

- 7. The Grand Jury observed that the "vast majority" of Taser-related deaths "occurred when the person received multiple [T]aser exposures." The Grand Jury found that Sheriff's Department officers had incorrectly assumed their Tasers were not working properly in scenarios where the targeted individual did not exhibit symptoms of neuromuscular incapacitation or compliance, leading to potentially unnecessary discharges. The Grand Jury also found that the Sheriff's Department's Taser training manual did not require on-scene tracking of Taser usage in scenarios involving multiple officers. It stated: "This lack of situational awareness may lead to multiple, repeated, and continuous exposures[.]" The Grand Jury made specific recommendations to the Sheriff's Department about ways to amend its Taser training manual and improve its training program to reduce the use of unnecessary, multiple, repeated, and continuous Taser exposures.
- 8. The Grand Jury's observations and recommendations were consistent with guidelines published by the U.S. Department of Justice in cooperation with the Police Executive Research Forum ("PERF") in 2011. The 2011 PERF Guidelines noted that "repeated or multiple applications [of Tasers] may increase risk of death," and they stressed that "[o]fficers must be trained to understand that repeated applications and continuous cycling of [Tasers] may increase the risk of death or serious injury and should be avoided."
- 9. The Sheriff's Department issued a response to the Final Report, agreeing with the Grand Jury's findings. With respect to the Grand Jury's recommendations, the Sheriff's Department indicated that it would:
  - Assess options to improve communication among deputies involved in Taser deployment to minimize the possibility of unnecessary, repeat, and prolonged Taser exposures;
  - b. Continue educating deputies on identification of effective Taser deployment and the importance of situational awareness;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Community Policing Services & Police Executive Research Forum, 2011 Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines ("PERF Guidelines") (2011) p. 13 <a href="http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p202-pub.pdf">http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p202-pub.pdf</a> (as of Mar. 5, 2015).

- c. Reinforce, in future training, the importance of alternative force options when a deputy believes the Taser is ineffective, "to minimize [T]aser dependency or repeated or prolonged use."
- On August 12, 2014, a Sheriff's Department deputy shot Victorville resident Dante Parker 12 times with a Taser. According to Mr. Parker's family, other Sheriff's deputies arrived later and also deployed their Tasers against him in total, he received up to 27 Taser shocks before he died shortly thereafter. Mr. Parker was unarmed.
- 11. Subsequently, the NAACP's San Bernardino and Victor Valley branches held a press conference calling for "transparency and accountability" for the circumstances surrounding Mr. Parker's death.
- 12. Since the issuance of the Grand Jury's Final Report, numerous current and former inmates have alleged that Sheriff's Department deputies staffing the West Valley Detention Center routinely and repeatedly shocked them with Tasers, with little or no provocation sometimes as part of hazing rituals or for the deputies' entertainment.
- 13. In light of the above events, the ACLU served a CPRA request on the Sheriff's Department to obtain certain documents regarding its Taser policies and practices. The ACLU sought to review records related to the implementation (if any) of measures the Sheriff's Department agreed to take in response to the Grand Jury's Final Report, as well as information relating to the Sheriff's Department's Taser use that could reveal the efficacy or insufficiency of such measures.
- 14. The Sheriff's Department refused to disclose records responsive to the ACLU's CPRA request. It asserted that it was entitled to withhold all records containing information about the number and duration of exposures involved in Taser deployments by Sheriff's deputies, because such information is contained in use of force reports; it claimed that use of force reports are exempt from disclosure under the CPRA because they are privileged attorney-client communications and contain attorney work product. The Sheriff's Department made the same assertions about records containing information about the stated justifications for its deputies' Taser deployments. As set forth in further detail herein, the Sheriff's Department's claims that use of force reports are

privileged attorney-client communications and attorney work product are legally and factually baseless.

- 15. The information about Taser use that the Sheriff's Department withheld is contained in disclosable records other than use of force reports, but the Sheriff's Department failed to identify and produce those records. The Sheriff's Department failed to adequately search for, identify, and produce other records requested by the ACLU, such as documents related to revisions to the Sheriff's Department's Taser policies and training manuals and the need for such revisions.
- Only by having access to the records requested by the ACLU can the public properly evaluate whether the Sheriff's Department has taken seriously the concerns raised by the Grand Jury's Final Report, and whether and how the Sheriff's Department has taken action to curtail the inappropriate, excessive, and/or abusive use of Tasers. Given the Sheriff's Department's consistent and sometimes fatal problems with use of Tasers, the public has an interest in understanding how Sheriff's deputies deploy these weapons against members of the public in San Bernardino County.
- The danger of improper Taser use has become a matter of serious public concern, nationwide and internationally. On November 28, 2014, the United Nations Committee Against Torture released its Concluding Observations, wherein it offered recommendations for systemic reform that would align the United States with its international human rights commitments. In its Concluding Observations, the Committee expressed concern about "numerous, consistent reports that police have used electrical discharge weapons against unarmed individuals who . . . fail to comply immediately with commands." The Committee observed a need for "more stringent instructions to law enforcement personnel entitled to use electric discharge weapons," as well as strict monitoring and supervision of Taser use "through mandatory reporting and review of each use."
- 18. Despite the public's strong interest in information about the Sheriff's Department's Taser use, the Sheriff's Department has disregarded its legal obligations under the CPRA and denied public access to the information requested by the ACLU.

## THE PARTIES

- 19. Petitioner ACLU is a non-profit, nonpartisan 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) organization dedicated to the constitutional principles of liberty and equality. The ACLU has offices in Los Angeles, San Bernardino, and Santa Ana.
- 20. The ACLU is committed to ensuring that the American government, on both a state and federal level, complies with the Constitution and laws in matters that affect civil liberties and human rights. The ACLU is also committed to principles of transparency and accountability in government, and seeks to ensure that the American public is informed about the conduct of its government in matters that affect civil liberties and human rights. Dissemination of information to the public about actual or alleged government activity is a critical and substantial component of the ACLU's mission and work.
- The ACLU is a member of the public within the scope of the CPRA and the California Constitution and is beneficially interested in the outcome of these proceedings. *See* Gov't Code § 6252, subdivs. (b), (c). It has a clear, present, and substantial right to the relief sought herein and no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law other than that sought here.
- The Sheriff's Department is a government agency duly organized and operating in San Bernardino County, California. As such, the Sheriff's Department is a local agency within the scope of the CPRA, and may be compelled to release improperly withheld public records. *See* Gov't Code § 6252, subdiv. (a).
  - 23. The Sheriff's Department is in possession of the records sought by this Petition.

## JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 24. This Court has jurisdiction under sections 6258 and 6259 of the Government Code, sections 1060 and 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and Article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution.
- 25. Venue is proper in this Court. The records in question, or some portion of them, are situated in the County of San Bernardino. See Gov't Code § 6259; Code Civ. Proc. § 401(1). In addition, the Sheriff's Department has an office located in the County of San Bernardino, and the

acts and omissions complained of herein occurred in the County of San Bernardino. See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 393, 394 subdiv. (a).

## FACTUAL BACKGROUND

# The ACLU's Public Records Request

- 26. On January 30, 2015, Petitioner ACLU sent a CPRA request to the Sheriff's Department (the "January 2015 request"). A true and correct copy of the January 2015 request is attached to this Petition as Exhibit A.
- 27. All of the records the ACLU sought in the January 2015 request fall within the definition of public records set forth in the CPRA. Gov't Code § 6252.
- 28. The January 2015 request sought documents previously requested from the Sheriff's Department in separate CPRA requests dated September 26, 2014 (the "September 2014 request") and November 12, 2014 (the "November 2014 request"), to which the Sheriff's Department had inadequately responded. True and correct copies of the September 2014 request and the November 2014 request are attached to this Petition as Exhibits B and C, respectively.
- 29. The Sheriff's Department responded to the September 2014 request and the November 2014 request in letters dated October 16, 2014 and November 20, 2014 (the "October 2014 response" and the "November 2014 response," respectively). In those letters, the Sheriff's Department agreed to provide certain categories of records; claimed that some requested records did not exist; and refused to disclose other requested records, claiming that they are exempt from disclosure under the CPRA. True and correct copies of the October 2014 response and the November 2014 response are attached to this Petition as Exhibits D and E, respectively.
- 30. Although the Sheriff's Department produced some documents in response to the September 2014 request and the November 2014 request, its responses to those requests were incomplete and inadequate in the following ways:
  - a. The Sheriff's Department improperly withheld records responsive to the September 2014 request and the November 2014 request, claiming that those records are exempt from disclosure under the CPRA. For example, the Sheriff's Department refused to disclose any records compiling and/or listing the number and duration of

exposures associated with Taser deployments, asserting that such information "would be contained in a Use of Force report." *See* Exhibit D, pp. 3-4. The Sheriff's Department also refused to disclose any records reflecting the justifications or reasons for Taser deployments because such information would be contained in use of force reports. The Sheriff's Department erroneously claimed that such reports "are generated at the behest of County Counsel in anticipation of litigation and, as such, are attorney-client communications made privileged pursuant to Evidence Code Section 954." *See* Exhibit D, p. 4. The Sheriff's Department also erroneously claimed that use of force reports "contain attorney work product that is privileged pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 2018.030(a)." *See id*.

- b. The Sheriff's Department claimed that records sought by the September 2014 and November 2014 requests do not exist, when in fact it has prepared, owned, retained, and used such records; the Sheriff's Department failed to conduct a search adequate to identify and compile the records it claimed do not exist. For example, the September 2014 request sought documents relating to deaths associated with Taser deployments by Sheriff's deputies. Although the Sheriff's Department has such records in its possession, it failed to identify or provide any such records, claiming only: "there is no such instances [sic]." Similarly, the Sheriff's Department retains records relating to the utilization of use of force reports in its systems of internal review, as well as records relating to its transmission of use of force reports to entities other than County Counsel, but it claimed that those records do not exist in its response to the November 2014 request for records.
- c. The Sheriff's Department did not search for or produce all records responsive to the September 2014 request and the November 2014 request; its public records production was incomplete even for the categories of records that it agreed were disclosable. For example, the Sheriff's Department agreed to disclose records reflecting the Sheriff's Department's training materials and policies on Taser use at the time of the Grand Jury's inquiry, as well as records reflecting the Sheriff's

Department's current training materials and policies on Taser use; the September 2014 request sought both categories of documents. The September 2014 request also sought records reflecting revisions to the Sheriff's Department's training materials and policies on Taser use, and records relating to any evaluation, assessment, or review of those policies conducted in response to the Grand Jury's Final Report. The Sheriff's Department claimed that all such records were included in the documents it produced in response to the September 2014 request. However, the Sheriff's Department produced only one version of its Taser training materials and policies and two manuals released by the company TASER International, Inc., in response to the September 2014 request; it failed to produce records sufficient to identify whether and how the Sheriff's Department has made changes to its Taser training program since the time of the Grand Jury's inquiry.

- 31. To address the insufficiency of the Sheriff's Department's responses to the September 2014 and November 2014 requests, the ACLU sought records responsive to those requests by submitting the January 2015 request. The January 2015 request asked the Sheriff's Department for records responsive to the September 2014 and November 2014 requests that it had failed to produce, including, specifically:
  - a. Records compiled or created in response to the 2012-2013 San Bernardino County
    Grand Jury's inquiry and report on San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department's
    Taser policies and usage (see Exhibit A, p. 1);
  - b. Records compiling and/or listing the following information with respect to the deployment of Tasers by Sheriff's Department officers from January 1, 2008 to the present:
    - The number and duration of exposures associated with any such deployments; or
    - ii. The justifications and/or reasons for any such deployments (see Exhibit A, p. 1);

- c. Any records reflecting or relating to revisions, updates, or the need for revisions or updates to the Taser Training Academy Manual, Instructor's Certification Lesson Plan, or other Taser-related training materials since 2009 (see Exhibit A, p. 2);
- d. Any other records reflecting current Sheriff's Department's policies, procedures, or guidelines regarding the use of Tasers, including those governing the use of Tasers (see Exhibit A, p. 2);
- e. Records reflecting the Sheriff's Department's policies and procedures with respect to the investigation and review of uses of force (see Exhibit A, p. 2);
- f. Records relating to the Sheriff's Department's transmission of reports, documentation, or data concerning uses of force to entities outside the Sheriff's Department, including, but not limited to, the San Bernardino County Grand Jury, federal investigators, or county, state or city auditors (see Exhibit A, p. 2);
- g. Records reflecting the Sheriff's Department's current policies and procedures with respect to the creation of incident reports and arrest records, and any prior versions of such policies or procedures effective at any time in the last ten years (*see* Exhibit A, p. 2); and
- h. Any prior versions of blank forms used by the Sheriff's Department to report or document uses of force and/or instructions for those forms used in the last ten years (see Exhibit A, p. 2).
- 32. On February 5, 2015, the Sheriff's Department responded by letter to the January 2015 request. It reiterated the Sheriff's Department's positions articulated in the October 2014 and November 2014 responses and stated "that no further information is available at this time and the responses already provided are confirmed." A true and correct copy of the Sheriff's Department's response letter is attached to this Petition as Exhibit F.

# Records Related to the Sheriff's Department's Taser Deployment and Use of Force Reports

33. The Sheriff's Department has withheld records that would make it possible for the public to evaluate how Sheriff's deputies actually utilize Tasers against members of the public,

including records containing anonymized and/or aggregate information. For the reasons described, the manner and extent to which Sheriff's deputies deploy Tasers against individuals in San Bernardino County is a matter of great public concern.

- 34. The January 2015 request sought records compiling and/or listing the number and duration of exposures associated with Taser deployments. In responding to the January 2015 request, the Sheriff's Department failed to produce any such records. Rather, the Sheriff's Department reaffirmed its October 2014 response to the September 2014 request, in which it refused to disclose any such records asserting that information about the number and duration of exposures associated with the Sheriff's Department's Taser deployments is contained in use of force reports, and claiming that use of force reports are privileged attorney-client communications that contain attorney work product. *See* Exhibit F, p. 1.
- 35. The January 2015 request sought records listing and/or compiling information relating to the justifications and/or reasons for the Sheriff's Department's Taser deployments. In responding to the January 2015 request, the Sheriff's Department failed to produce any such records. Rather, the Sheriff's Department simply reaffirmed its response to the September 2014 request, in which it refused to disclose any such records asserting that information about the justifications and/or reasons for the Sheriff's Department's Taser deployments would be contained in use of force reports, and claiming that use of force reports are privileged attorney-client communications that contain attorney work product. *See id.*
- 36. According to its own use of force policy, the Sheriff's Department's completed use of force reports are *not* privileged attorney-client communications. The Sheriff's Department's use of force policy requires officers to transmit use of force reports to their commanding officers for review. The policy requires commanding officers to review each completed use of force report to determine whether further action or investigation is warranted, and, if he or she believes no such action or investigation is warranted, to forward the completed report to the Civil Liabilities

  Division whose staff does not include an attorney for processing and filing. The Sheriff's Department's policy does not require officers to transmit completed use of force reports to any attorney, or to consult with any attorney during or prior to the completion of the use of force forms.

Similarly, the Sheriff's Department's instruction sheet for its use of force form-set, as do its training materials, directs officers to transmit completed use of force forms to a commanding officer, but does not instruct officers to communicate the completed forms to any attorney.

- 37. Sheriff's Department officers do not complete use of force reports at the behest of County Counsel to prepare for civil litigation; they complete use of force reports as part of their official duties, in the ordinary course of their business as law enforcement officers. A use of force report is required to be completed following every instance of Taser use as a matter of official policy, not at the instruction of an attorney. Moreover, the policy does not instruct, much less require, the officer completing the form to consult an attorney while doing so, but rather makes clear the officer exercises his or her own discretion when completing the form, as required.
- 38. The Sheriff's Department requires its officers to prepare use of force reports following every instance of Taser use for purposes other than preparing for civil litigation. As its use of force policy makes clear, the Sheriff's Department utilizes use of force reports for staff accountability and internal review to enable command officers to supervise the performance of their personnel, and to investigate and curtail potential misconduct.
- 39. According to its own use of force policy, the Sheriff's Department's completed use of force reports are also not protected from disclosure as attorney work product. The policy requires supervising officers to complete use of force report forms. It does not indicate that an attorney should complete any portion of that report; neither does the use of force report form indicate a need for or a place reserved for recording an attorney's notes or impressions.
- 40. The Sheriff's Department has not treated use of force reports as privileged attorney-client communications or attorney work product. It has disclosed use of force reports to parties other than County Counsel, such as the U.S. Marshals Service, when those parties were not engaged in legal representation of the Sheriff's Department. When the ACLU asked the Sheriff's Department to produce records relating to the transmission of use of force reports to entities outside the Sheriff's Department, however, the Sheriff's Department claimed that no such records exist.

  See Exhibit A, p. 2; Exhibit C, p. 2; Exhibit E, p. 2. The Sheriff's Department's refusal to produce or perform a search for such records is itself a violation of the CPRA.

- 41. Other law enforcement agencies do not treat use of force reports as privileged attorney-client communications or attorney work product. Many law enforcement agencies publicly disclose use of force reports or statistics reflecting the information reported therein.<sup>2</sup> Some have adopted policies that specifically require the public disclosure of information from use of force reports documenting Taser use, once personally identifying information is removed.<sup>3</sup>
- 42. ACLU affiliates have requested and successfully obtained Taser use of force reports from other law enforcement agencies that use forms substantially identical to the Taser use of force form that the Sheriff's Department utilizes.<sup>4</sup> Members of the news media have also obtained Taser use reports from other law enforcement agencies by filing public records requests.<sup>5</sup>
- Taser use of force report form that is substantially similar to the form that the Sheriff's Department utilizes. Connecticut law requires law enforcement agencies to report information recorded in those forms to the public on an annual basis. *See* Conn. Pub. Act No. 14-149.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See, e.g., San Diego Sheriff's Department, Use of Force/Internal Affairs Statistical Report (2014) <a href="http://www.sdsheriff.net/documents/2014\_ia\_stats.pdf">http://www.sdsheriff.net/documents/2014\_ia\_stats.pdf</a> (making information gathered from use of force reports and internal investigations available to the public to "improve organizational transparency," to inform the public about how frequently deputies use force, and to "clearly show that the Sheriff holds his personnel accountable for their actions"); Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Non-deadly Use of Force Analysis (2012-2013) <a href="http://www.lvmpd.com/Portals/0/OIO/Non-Deadly\_Use\_of\_Force\_Report\_2013\_FINAL.pdf">http://www.lvmpd.com/Portals/0/OIO/Non-Deadly\_Use\_of\_Force\_Report\_2013\_FINAL.pdf</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See, e.g., Spokane County Sheriff's Department, Policy Manual (2015) p. 67 <a href="http://www.spokanecounty.org/data/countysheriff/pdf/Current\_Policy\_Manual1-15-15.pdf">http://www.spokanecounty.org/data/countysheriff/pdf/Current\_Policy\_Manual1-15-15.pdf</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See, e.g., ACLU of Nebraska, Dangerously Out of Bounds: Taser Use in Nebraska (2014) p. 7 <a href="http://www.aclunebraska.org/index.php/police-conduct/208-dangerously-out-of-bounds-tasers-in-nebraska">http://www.aclunebraska.org/index.php/police-conduct/208-dangerously-out-of-bounds-tasers-in-nebraska</a> (listing three county sheriff's departments and seven police departments that provided the ACLU of Nebraska with Taser use reports, and publishing examples of those reports); New York Civil Liberties Union ("NYCLU"), Taking Tasers Seriously (2011) pp. 2, 10-11 <a href="http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/nyclu\_TaserFinal.pdf">http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/nyclu\_TaserFinal.pdf</a> (noting that NYCLU analyzed 851 Taser incident reports from eight law enforcement agencies across the state, and providing example of report produced by a New York police department).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Noelle Phillips, Denver jail's Taser use at odds with federal guidelines, Post finds, Denver Post (Nov. 3, 2014) (reporting on analysis of 14 Taser use reports created by Denver Sheriff's Department's deputies, which were obtained by the Post through a public records request).

- Federal guidelines recommend that law enforcement agencies publicly disclose information about Taser use documented in use of force reports. The 2011 PERF Guidelines recommend that law enforcement agencies document every instance of Taser use, and collect information about "[t]he number of [Taser] activations, the duration of each cycle, the duration between activations, and . . . the duration that the subject received applications." The PERF Guidelines also recommend that law enforcement agencies collect information relevant to the justifications for each Taser use, including the level of aggression encountered by the officer; whether deadly force would have been justified; whether the subject possessed any weapons; and the type of crime/incident the subject was involved in. The PERF Guidelines recommend that law enforcement agencies periodically analyze this information, and make it "available to the public." Sheriff's Department officers do not complete use of force reports at the behest of County Counsel to prepare for civil litigation; they complete use of force reports as part of their official duties, in the ordinary course of their business as law enforcement officers. They automatically complete use of force reports following every instance of Taser use because Sheriff's Department policy requires them to do so — not because they are specifically instructed to do so by any attorney.
- 45. As a matter of standard practice, the vast majority of law enforcement agencies across the country generate use of force reports every time an officer uses more than a minimal level of force. For decades, law enforcement agencies have utilized use of force reports to maintain internal accountability, to determine whether individual officers should be disciplined for dangerous behavior or poor performance, and to identify problematic practices that may call for retraining of officers or amendment of agency policies. Thus, use of force reports form an integral part of law enforcement operations for reasons independent of civil litigation.
- When the ACLU requested the Sheriff's Department to produce records reflecting or relating to the utilization or inclusion of use of force reports in any Department procedure or system, however, the Sheriff's Department claimed that no such records exist. *See* Exhibit A, p. 2; Exhibit C, p. 1; Exhibit F. The Sheriff's Department's refusal to produce or perform a search for such records is itself a violation of the CPRA. *See* Gov't Code §§ 6250 *et seq*.
  - 47. Moreover, the information about the Sheriff's Department's Taser use that was

sought in the September 2014 request and in the ACLU's January 2015 request — the number and duration of exposures associated with Taser deployments, and the reasons and/or justifications for incidents of Taser use — is contained in records other than use of force reports.

- 48. The number and duration of exposures associated with the Sheriff's Department's Taser deployments are contained in records created by the Taser devices' on-board memory system. As noted in the Sheriff's Department's own Taser training materials, the Taser device has an internal memory that records the date, time, and duration of each discharge. That data can be downloaded by the Sheriff's Department at any time. Indeed, the 2011 PERF Guidelines, the model Taser policy drafted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the use of force policies of many law enforcement agencies across the country call on supervising officers to conduct periodic audits of Taser use by comparing Taser memory data with information that officers report in use of force forms. In responding to the January 2015 request, however, the Sheriff's Department failed to produce or even refer to any Taser memory data. Rather, the Sheriff's Department simply reaffirmed its response to the September 2014 request, in which it refused to disclose information about the number and duration of exposures associated with its officers' Taser deployments because such information is contained in use of force reports and is therefore purportedly protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine.
- 49. The justifications and reasons for the Sheriff's Department's Taser deployments are also contained in other records in the Sheriff's Department's possession. According to the Sheriff's Department's use of force policy and training materials, an officer that deploys a Taser must complete a report or memorandum containing a detailed description of the facts involved and the underlying reasons for the decision to use that particular level of force. In responding to the January 2015 request, however, the Sheriff's Department failed to produce or even refer to any such reports or memoranda. It simply reaffirmed its response to the September 2014 request, in which it refused to disclose any information about the justifications and/or reasons for its officers' Taser deployments because such information is contained in use of force reports and is therefore

purportedly protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine.

- 50. The Sheriff's Department never produced or justified its withholding of records containing Taser memory data or officer memoranda relating to Taser use. The Sheriff's Department's refusal to download, produce, or perform a search for additional records, other than use of force reports, that contain the requested information about the number and duration of exposures and the justifications and/or reasons for Taser deployment, is itself a violation of the CPRA.
- 51. The January 2015 request sought records relating to deaths associated with the use of a Taser by a Sheriff's Department deputy. In responding to the January 2015 request, the Sheriff's Department again failed to produce any such records. Rather, the Sheriff's Department simply reaffirmed its response to the September 2014 request, in which it claimed that "there is no such instances [sic]." Exhibit D, p. 3.

# Records Related to the Sheriff's Department's Taser Training Program and Policy

- 52. In its official response to the Grand Jury's Final Report, the Sheriff's Department suggested that it would make certain changes to its Taser training program and explore certain proposed changes to its Taser policy. The Sheriff's Department has refused to disclose records requested by the ACLU that would make it possible for the public to evaluate whether and how the Sheriff's Department has revised its Taser training program and/or policy to address the problems identified in the Final Report.
- Taser policy manual used by the Sheriff's Department at the time of the Grand Jury's inquiry. The September 2014 request also sought records reflecting the Taser training materials and policy manual currently used by the Sheriff's Department. In its October 2014 response, the Sheriff's Department agreed to produce these records. However, the materials that the Sheriff's Department provided include only one version of the Sheriff's Department's training materials and policy manual. The records produced by the Sheriff's Department are not sufficient to clarify whether any of the provided materials are copies of materials used at the time of the Grand Jury's inquiry the

Sheriff's Department has since retired from use, or whether any or all of the records are copies of materials the Sheriff's Department currently uses to instruct its officers on Taser use and policy.

- 54. Accordingly, the January 2015 request sought additional records relating to the Taser training materials and policy manual in place at the time of the Grand Jury's inquiry, and those used by the Sheriff's Department at present. In responding to the January 2015 request, however, the Sheriff's Department failed to produce any additional clarifying records. The Sheriff's Department simply reaffirmed its prior response to the September 2014 request.
- The September 2014 request also sought records reflecting any "evaluation, assessment, or review conducted in response to the Grand Jury's [F]inal [R]eport," as well as "records reflecting or relating to revisions, updates, or the need for revisions or updates" to the Sheriff's Department's Taser training materials and policy manual, from before the time of the 2012 Grand Jury inquiry to the present. In response, the Sheriff's Department simply produced two training manuals that the company TASER International, Inc., released in 2013, and stated: "There have been no changes to the Sheriff's Department's policies regarding the use of Tasers since 2009." *See* Exhibit B, pp. 1-2, Exhibit D, pp. 2-3. In its October 2014 response, the Sheriff's Department failed to produce, reference, or justify the withholding of any other records reflecting or relating to the need for revisions or updates to its Taser policies, or any evaluation, assessment, or review it conducted in response to the Grand Jury's Final Report even though it had stated in its official response to the Final Report that it was exploring ways to improve communication among deputies involved in Taser deployment to minimize the possibility of unintended, unnecessary, repeat and continuous exposures.
- 56. Accordingly, the January 2015 request sought "records . . . created in response to" the Grand Jury's Final Report, as well as "records reflecting or relating to revisions, updates, or the need for revisions or updates" to the Sheriff's Department's Taser training materials and policy manual, from before the time of the 2012 Grand Jury inquiry to the present that the Sheriff's Department had failed to produce in response to the September 2014 request. *See* Exhibit A, pp. 1-2. In responding to the January 2015 request, the Sheriff's Department failed to produce any records. Rather, the Sheriff's Department simply reaffirmed its October 2014 response.

# FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

# For Violation of the California Public Records Act, Gov't Code §§ 6250 et seq. & Article I, § 3 of the California Constitution

(Petitioner ACLU v. Respondent Sheriff's Department)

- 57. Petitioner ACLU incorporates herein by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 56 above, as if set forth in full.
- 58. Petitioner ACLU was at all times ready to tender any required fees for the identifiable public records requested. Nevertheless, the Sheriff's Department has withheld records reasonably described and requested by the ACLU that are not exempt from disclosure under any express provision of law.
- 59. The Sheriff's Department also failed to make a reasonable effort to conduct a complete search for records responsive to the ACLU's requests. *See*, *e.g.*, Gov't Code § 6253.1 (requiring a government agency to make a reasonable effort to "assist [the ACLU] to identify records and information . . . responsive to the request or to the purpose of the request"; to "[d]escribe the information technology and physical location in which the records exist"; and to "[p]rovide suggestions for overcoming any practical basis for denying access to the records or information sought.").
- 60. The Sheriff's Department did not take any of the actions listed in the previous paragraph to assist Petitioner ACLU in making an effective request, before asserting that there were no records responsive to the January 2015 request. *See id.*
- 61. By refusing to provide records responsive to the ACLU's January 2015 request, the Sheriff's Department has denied Petitioner ACLU access to information concerning the Sheriff's Department's conduct of the people's business, and it has shielded the writings of public officials and the Sheriff's Department from public scrutiny, in violation of the California Constitution. *See* Cal. Const. art. 1, § 3(b)(1) ("The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business, and therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.").

62. The Sheriff's Department's refusal to release records and its inadequate search for records, as evidenced by the inconsistent record productions, violate the CPRA and article I, section 3 of the California Constitution.

## PRAYER FOR RELIEF

**THEREFORE**, the ACLU respectfully prays as follows:

- 1. That this Court issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Sheriff's Department to disclose to Petitioner ACLU the requested records, immediately and without delay, except those records that the Court determines may lawfully be withheld;
- 2. That the Court set times for responsive pleadings and for hearings in these proceedings, if necessary, "with the object of securing a decision as to these matters at the earliest possible time," as provided by Government Code section 6258.
- 3. That the Court enter an order awarding Petitioner ACLU its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this action, as provided by Government Code section 6259; and

By:

4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: March 26, 2015 DANIEL RYGORSKY

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ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ADRIENNA WONG BELINDA ESCOBOSA HELZER

By: All

Adrienna Wong

Attorneys for Petitioner
ACLU OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

## VERIFICATION

- I, Adrienna Wong, declare:
- 1. I am an attorney for the ACLU of Southern California, the Petitioner in this action.
- 2. I have read the foregoing VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE DIRECTED TO SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT ORDERING COMPLIANCE WITH THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RECORDS ACT. The facts stated in paragraphs 13-14, 26-29, 31-32, 34-35, 46, 50-51, and 53-56 of the Petition are within my knowledge, and I know them to be true and correct.

This verification was executed on March <u>25</u>, 2015, in Los Angeles, California. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

ADRIENNA WONG

## VERIFICATION

I, Hector O. Villagra, declare:

- 1. I am Executive Director for the ACLU of Southern California, the Petitioner in this action, and I am authorized to make this verification on Petitioner's behalf.
- 2. I have read the foregoing VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE DIRECTED TO SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT ORDERING COMPLIANCE WITH THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RECORDS ACT. The facts stated in paragraph 19-20 are within my knowledge, and I know them to be true and correct. I am informed and believe that the facts alleged in paragraphs 1-12, 15-18, 21-25, 30, 33, 36-45, 47-49, 52, and 57-62 of the Petition are true and correct, and on that basis I allege them to be true.

This verification was executed on March 33, 2015, in Los Angeles, California. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

HECTOR O. VILLAGRA