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11 12	UNITED STATES D NORTHERN DISTRIC SAN FRANCISO	T OF CALIFORNIA
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13 14	Sofia Bahena Ortuño; Gennady Valeryevich Lavrus; Claude Bent; Charles Joseph; Salomon Medina Calderon; Ricardo Vasquez	Case No.
15	Cruz; J Elias Solorio Lopez; Olvin Said Lopez; Olvin Said Torres Murillo; Julio Cesar Buendia Alas; Marco Montoya	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER;
16 17	Amaya; Mauricio Ernesto Quinteros Lopez; Roxana del Carmen Trigueros Acevedo; Ernesto Ambrocio Uc Encarnacion;	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF
18	Petitioners-Plaintiffs,	
19	v.	
20	DAVID JENNINGS, Acting Director of the	
21	San Francisco Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; MATTHEW T.	
22	ALBENCE, Deputy Director and Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director	
23	of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; U.S. IMMIGRATION AND	
24	CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,	
25	Respondents-Defendants.	
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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, as soon as they may be heard, Plaintiffs will and hereby
do move, pursuant to Civil L. R. 7-1 and 65-1, for a temporary restraining order directing that
they be immediately released from their current confinement at the Mesa Verde ICE Processing
Facility and the Yuba County Jail, under appropriate conditions as may be deemed necessary by
the Court. This motion is supported by the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, by
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, and
by declarations of each of the Plaintiffs, or their attorneys on their behalf, and various experts, all
of which are filed contemporaneously.
Pursuant to Civil L.R. 65-1(b), on March 24, 2020 at 9 a.m., counsel for Plaintiffs left a

Pursuant to Civil L.R. 65-1(b), on March 24, 2020 at 9 a.m., counsel for Plaintiffs left a voice message for Assistant U.S. Attorney Sara Winslow at the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California and sent an e-mail to Ms. Winslow to advise of the emergency reasons requiring them to seek a temporary restraining order. In addition, Plaintiffs' Counsel e-mailed copies of (1) the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, (2) Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, and (3) [Proposed] Order to Ms. Winslow.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, civil immigration detainees whose age and/or underlying medical conditions place them at elevated risk of serious illness or death from contracting COVID-19, seek emergency relief from this Court. Despite an overwhelming consensus of public health experts—including two doctors contracted by the Department of Homeland Security—Defendants have inexplicably and unjustifiably refused to reduce the number of people in detention in the face of COVID-19, beginning with the most medically vulnerable. Authorities nationwide are taking drastic measures necessary to contain this deadly pandemic. California jails released thousands of people incarcerated in the criminal justice system to avoid risking the lives of detainees and the community at large. "In light of the rapidly escalating public health crisis, which public health authorities predict will especially impact immigration detention centers," the Ninth Circuit yesterday "order[ed] that [an immigration detainee] be immediately released from detention[.]" *Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr*, -- F.3d --, No. 18-71460 (9th Cir., March 23, 2020) (for publication). Plaintiffs ask this Court to follow suit and order their immediate release.

Plaintiffs' health conditions make them exceptionally vulnerable to serious illness or death if they contract COVID-19. The Eighth Amendment protects against "a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month or year." *Helling v. McKinney*, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). As civil detainees, Plaintiffs enjoy greater protections under the Due Process Clause than prisoners do under the Eighth Amendment. COVID-19's danger renders Plaintiffs' ongoing detention unconstitutional.

This is the quintessential scenario in which emergency relief is necessary to avert irreparable harm. Public health experts agree that Plaintiffs will experience serious injury or death if infected by COVID-19, and that the spread of COVID-19 to immigration detention facilities is inevitable. Those experts agree, moreover, that reducing the number of people detained, starting with those who are most vulnerable to COVID-19, serves the public interest by

reducing the risk of widespread infection in a closed environment that will overwhelm demands on the local health care infrastructure, especially intensive care units. With ankle-monitoring and other alternatives to detention available, if necessary, ICE's interest in Plaintiffs' current detention pales in comparison to the extraordinary equities in favor of release. The Court should grant this motion and order Plaintiffs' release.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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A. COVID-19 Has Killed Thousands of People, and While the Effort to Stop the Outbreak Has Transformed Human Behavior Around the World, ICE's Response Has Been Haphazard and Wholly Inadequate.

The medical information described below is based on the accompanying declarations of five physicians with first-hand knowledge of detainee health in immigration detention facilities: Robert Greifinger, MD, who has a long career of managing medical care for inmates (Greifinger \P 1¹); Marc Stern, MD, who has deep experience with the immigration detention system (Stern \P 1); Ranit Mishori, MD, MHS, FAAFP, who has studied medical outcomes of individuals in correctional facilities (Mishori ¶ 2); Jonathan Louis Golob, a professor specializing in infections in immunocompromised patients (Golob ¶ 2); and Allen S. Keller, MD, who has deep experience reporting on conditions of detention in ICE facilities (Keller ¶ 2-3). Plaintiffs also present the declarations of public health expert Sandra Hernandez, President and CEO of the California Healthcare Foundation and the former Director of Health for the City and County of San Francisco (Hernandez P1); and Andrew Lorenzen-Strait, former Deputy Assistant Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations for ICE (Lorenzen-Strat № 2).

It is now beyond dispute that COVID-19 is a rapidly escalating global pandemic with devastating effects, particularly on the elderly and immunocompromised. Golob PP 3, 8; Stern P 5; Mishori P 9. The numbers of confirmed diagnoses and deaths cited on any given day quickly lose meaning as the figures grow exponentially. Golob \ 2; Mishori \ 6. In any event, the actual number of infected is far higher that what is reported, due to a shortage of diagnostic tests.

¹ All of the declarations submitted herewith will be cited using this shorthand, e.g., name of declarant followed by paragraph number.

Hernandez PP 8, 11; Mishori P 6. Alarming projections by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") indicate that over 200 million people in the United States could become infected with COVID-19 over the course of the epidemic without effective public health intervention, with as many as 1.5 million deaths in the most severe projections. Golob Decl. ¶ 11.

There is no known vaccine, treatment, or cure for COVID-19. Golob ¶ 10. Because the virus has not been contained, the only available measures to effectively reduce the risk of infection are social distancing and improved hygiene. *Id.*; Hernandez ¶ 14.

In a matter of days, COVID-19's threat of mass fatalities has transformed American life. Recognizing the public health threats posed by interpersonal proximity, cities and states have responded by imposing unprecedented restrictions on human interaction. On March 16, seven Bay Area counties established "shelter in place" orders, and the entire State of California followed three days later. Hernandez ¶ 18.

Many of the state's largest jails have released people detained in the criminal justice system to protect those people and the community from COVID-19. Alameda County's Santa Rita Jail released 250 people; Los Angeles County released more than 1,000; Kern County, where Mesa Verde is located, has released dozens. 4 The New York Board of Corrections called for "bold and urgent action" to "drastically reduce the [] jail population." The Supreme Court of New Jersey issued an order creating a presumption of release for every person serving a sentence

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² See Maura Dolan, et al., California releases more jail inmates amid coronavirus crisis, L.A. Times (March 20, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-03-20/californiareleases-more-jail-inmates-amid-coronavirus-crisis?

³ See Alene Tchekmedyian, et al., L.A. County releasing some inmates from jail to combat 23 coronavirus, L.A. Times (March 16, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-03-16/la-jail-population-arrests-down-amid-coronavirus 24

⁴ See Quinn Wilson, KCSO: Inmate releases based on mitigating spread of COVID-19, reserved for non-violent offenders, Bakersfield Californian (March 19, 2020),

https://www.bakersfield.com/news/breaking/kcso-inmate-releases-based-on-mitigating-spreadof-covid-/article 10ffc8a2-6a3d-11ea-b7b5-7b06de300554.html

⁵ Board of Correction City of New York, Letter from BOC re NYC Jails and Covid-19 (March 19, 2020) available at https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/News/covid-19/Letterfrom-BOC-re-NYC-Jails-and-COVID-19-2020-03-21.pdf

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Hixson recently observed, in ordering the release of an individual on bail after taking into account his risk of vulnerability to COVID-19. In the Matter of the Extradition of Alejandro Toledo Manrique, Case No. 19-mj-71055, 2020 WL 1307109, at *1 (N. D. Cal. March 19, 2020).

ICE's response to the threats the pandemic poses to immigrants, by contrast, has been singularly resistant. Last week as Californians began sheltering in place in compliance with public health directives, ICE's Los Angeles Field Office executed pre-dawn home raids to cram even more immigrants into ICE detention centers. The Field Office Director stated to the L.A. Times: "We couldn't factor this in, right? This COVID-19 and the precautions that everybody's taking We just have to continue to go with the same game plan that we've been doing."⁷ Following public outcry, ICE issued a statement recognizing the need for alternatives to detention for new arrestees to protect public health, but has inexplicably refused to apply that same logic to its current detainees. ECE went so far as to claim, in response to a lawsuit for the release of vulnerable ICE detainees, that "Plaintiffs' assertion that detention per se poses an increased risk of health complications or death from COVID-19 is purely speculative." Defs' Opp. at 8, Dawson v. Asher, ECF No. 28, Case No. 20-409 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 18, 2020).

While ICE refused to act to protect detainees, on March 19, 2020, two medical subject matter experts for the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties wrote to Congress that, in order "to implement immediate social distancing to reduce the likelihood of exposure to detainees, facility personnel, and the general public, it is essential to consider releasing all detainees who do not pose an immediate risk to public safety." Ltr. from Scott A. Allen, MD and Josiah Rich, MD, MPH to Cong'l Cmte. Chairpersons (March 19,

⁶ https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/5415/8496/4744/2020.03.22_-Consent Order Filed Stamped Copy-1.pdf

⁷ Brittny Mejia, With masks at the ready, ICE agents make arrests on first day of California coronavirus lockdown, L.A. Times, Mar. 18, 2020,

https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-03-17/for-ice-agents-its-business-as-unusual-dayafter-sweeping-coronavirus-order.

⁸ See https://www.ice.gov/covid19.

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2020) ("Allen & Rich Ltr.") (Exh. A to Freeman Decl.). On multiple occasions since at least February 25, 2020, these experts have sounded the alarm within the agency on the imminent risks to the health of immigrant detainees and the public at large presented by COVID-19 unless swift mitigation measures, including decreasing the number of immigrant detainees, are taken. *Id.*

Inside the facilities, moreover, immigrants say that ICE is not consistently taking even the less aggressive precautionary measures the agency claims it is taking. As set forth more fully below, the declarations of the Plaintiffs and other residents of Mesa Verde and Yuba, as well as attorneys who have recently visited there, demonstrate the frightening consequences of ICE's stubborn resistance to taking meaningful steps to mitigate the risk of infection. According to the two DHS whistleblower experts, "the track record of ICE facilities implementing [early screening, testing, isolation and quarantine] protocols historically has been inconsistent." Allen & Rich Ltr. Moreover, even if ICE was consistently taking these precautions, the DHS experts explain that they "won't be enough" without rapidly "releas[ing] those who do not pose an immediate danger to public safety."

B. COVID-19 Poses Grave Risk of Harm, Including Serious Illness or Death, to Older Adults and Those with Certain Medical Conditions.

People over the age of fifty face greater chances of serious illness or death from COVID-19. Golob ¶ 3; Stern ¶ 5. The Centers for Disease Control has concluded that certain underlying medical conditions increase the risk of serious COVID-19 symptoms for people of any age. These include lung disease, heart disease, chronic liver or kidney disease, diabetes, epilepsy, compromised immune systems (such as from cancer, HIV, or an autoimmune disease), blood disorders (including sickle cell disease), inherited metabolic disorders, stroke, developmental

⁹ Josiah Rich, Scott Allen & Mavis Noah, We Must Release Prisoners to Lessen the Spread of Coronavirus, The Washington Post, Mar. 17 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/17/we-must-release-prisoners-lessen-spread-coronavirus/.

delay, and pregnancy. ¹⁰ *Id*. For people with these risk factors, the consequences of COVID-19 can be severe, including temporary or permanent damage to the heart and lungs or death. Golob ¶ 7. These complications can manifest at an alarming pace. Although individuals may be asymptomatic for up to 14 days and may transmit the virus during this time, they can show the first symptoms of infection in as little as two days after exposure, and their condition can seriously deteriorate in as little as five days or sooner. Stern ¶ 4.

Most people in higher risk categories who develop severe effects of COVID-19 will need advanced supportive care, requiring highly specialized equipment that is in limited supply, and an entire team of care providers, including 1:1 or 1:2 nurse to patient ratios, respiratory therapists, and intensive care physicians. Golob ¶ 8.¹¹ Because severe COVID-19 cases require intensive medical care, an outbreak can "quickly overwhelm a health system," particularly in medically under-resourced rural areas. Greifinger ¶ 9; Hernandez ℙ 23.

The need for care, including intensive care, and the likelihood of lasting complications and death, is about ten times higher from COVID-19 infection than from influenza. Golob \P 4. For people in the highest risk populations, the fatality rate of COVID-19 infection is about fifteen percent. *Id.*

C. People Detained at Mesa Verde and Yuba Face an Elevated Risk of COVID-19 Transmission.

People in congregate environments—places where people live, eat, and sleep in close proximity—face increased danger of contracting COVID-19, as evidenced by the rapid spread of the virus in cruise ships and nursing homes. Golob ¶ 12. Immigration detention facilities have even an even greater risk of infectious spread than in the community and other congregate settings because of crowding, the proportion of vulnerable people detained, often deficient

¹⁰ This list is evolving. On March 23, 2020, the CDC updated its previous list as to who is at higher risk of serious illness if they were to contract COVID-19. *See* https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/specific-groups/people-at-higher-risk.html ¹¹ Even some younger and healthier people who contract COVID-19 may require supportive care, which includes supplemental oxygen, positive pressure ventilation, and in extreme cases,

1	hygiene and sanitation, and scant medical resources. Greifinger ¶¶ 14-20; Mishori ¶¶ 16-22;
2	Keller ¶¶ 6-11. People live in close quarters and may be unable to maintain the recommended
3	distance of six feet from others; there is often insufficient capacity for isolation of potentially or
4	actually infected people; people share or touch objects used by others; toilets, sinks, and showers
5	are shared, without disinfection between each use; food preparation and service is communal
6	with little opportunity for surface disinfection; detainees and staff come and go frequently. <i>Id</i> .
7	This is particularly problematic because people can transmit the disease while they are still
8	asymptomatic. Keller ¶ 13. Dr. Keller concludes that even under normal conditions, the health
9	care provided in immigration detention facilities is often unsafe, and this conclusion is backed up
10	by numerous recent governmental, non-governmental and investigative reports. Keller ¶ 14. Dr.
11	Greifinger, who currently monitors medical care for federal courts in three large county jails,
12	concludes it is "highly likely, and perhaps inevitable" that COVID-19 will reach immigration
13	detention facilities in California, and that these facilities "are not prepared to prevent the spread
14	of COVID-19, treat those who are most medically vulnerable, and contain any outbreak."
15	Greifinger ¶¶ 13, 23. In fact, because the virus is communicated by air or touch, it is more likely
16	to spread in these congregate environments; for this reason, detention facilities and jails have
17	repeatedly been the sites of past outbreaks of infectious diseases. Mishori ¶¶ 24, 26-27. During
18	the H1N1 influenza epidemic in 2009, jails and prisons were sites of severe outbreaks. <i>Id</i> . 12
19	There have already been COVID-19 outbreaks in jails which are ill-equipped to respond.
20	Greifinger № 24.
21	Recently observed conditions at Mesa Verde and Yuba confirm experts' worst fears.
22	Mesa Verde is an extremely compact facility where people sleep in bunk beds spaced only a few

feet apart and spend most of their time during the day in dorms that house up to 100 detainees. Knox ¶ 9. Sanitary practices are poor; visitors are not routinely screened; cleaning is done by

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¹² See also J. David McSwane, ICE Has Repeatedly Failed to Contain Contagious Diseases, Our Analysis Shows. It's a Danger to the Public, Pro Publica (Mar. 20, 2020), available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/ice-has-repeatedly-failed-to-contain-contagious-diseases-ouranalysis-shows-its-a-danger-to-the-public

exorbitant prices to buy them. *Id.* ¶¶ 11-13. Dormitory bathrooms lack basic hygiene supplies such as toilet paper and soap. *Id.* ¶ 5. One client reported that these conditions had not changed as recently as March 19, 2020. *Id.* ¶ 15. At Mesa Verde, an attorney visiting as recently as March 13, 2020 was denied a request to bring sanitizer with her and observed no hand sanitizer anywhere in the facility or any place to wash hands in the room where attorney visits are conducted. *Id.* ¶ 6. On this same day, no one was observed wearing masks; no signs were posted providing any information about coronavirus; and some detainees had not even been given any soap. *Id.* ¶¶ 7-8. The facility lacks the medical resources to respond to even basic medical issues, with detainees being denied necessary medications, or the wrong medication being given. *Id.* ¶ 4.

At Yuba, based on the direct observations of an attorney who conducts frequent site visits, detainees typically sleep in bunks that are less than three feet from each other; many of the housing units are extremely compact. Kavanagh ¶¶ 1, 3, 5, 10-11. Meals are served in group settings by detainees or county jail inmates with no instruction concerning sanitation. *Id.* ¶¶ 3-4. Cleaning is done by the detainees themselves, using dirty buckets of mop water and reused rags. *Id.* ¶ 4. Yuba regularly fails to provide adequate medical care to ICE detainees suffering from serious conditions such as lymphoma, skin cancer and head injuries; detainees consistently complaint that requests for medical visits are ignored. *Id.* ¶¶ 14-15

D. Plaintiffs Are Vulnerable to Serious Illness or Death if Infected by COVID-19.

Plaintiffs' experiences, and those of non-Plaintiff declarants¹³ confirm, in the starkest of terms, what the experts and attorney visitors are saying. It is difficult, if not impossible, within the confines of this brief, to adequately convey the nightmarish effects on Plaintiffs of their ongoing detention by Defendants during the current pandemic. In light of their age and/or compromised health, Plaintiffs live in constant terror of contracting COVID-19.

¹³ Most of the accompanying detainees' declarations are submitted by Plaintiffs; several additional declarations are submitted by detainees who are not Plaintiffs.

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35 Wolfe-Roubatis (Montoya Amaya) | 17; Buendia Alas | 12-13; Knox (Espinoza Ayala) | 12; Knox (Trigueros Acevedo) | 18; Weisner (Torres Murillo) | 12; Beaty (Moncada) | 10; Medina Calderon | 29; Bent | 14; Vasquez Cruz | 13; Yamane (Uc Encarnacion) | 16-17;

Ruiz Tovar 10; Yamane (Uc Encarnacion) 11; Minchaca Ramos 16.

14. Knox (Espinoza Ayala) 16-8; Yamane (Uc Encarnacion) 11; Patel (Quinteros) 8;

Martinez Lopez P 9; Upshaw (Lavrus) P 9; Minchaca Ramos P 7, 11.

E. In Light of Current Conditions, Public Health Experts Agree that People Most Vulnerable to COVID-19 Should Be Released from ICE Detention Facilities Immediately.

Because risk mitigation is the only known strategy that can protect vulnerable groups from COVID-19, and because it is virtually impossible to engage in the necessary social distancing and hygiene required to mitigate the risk of transmission in a congregate environment, public health experts with experience in immigration detention and correctional settings agree that "the most effective mitigation strategy" is to reduce crowding by releasing detainees from custody. Greifinger ¶ 27; Hernandez ¶ 28; Stern ¶¶ 11; Allen & Rich Ltr. at 5 ("it is essential to consider releasing all detainees who do not pose an immediate risk to public safety") (emphasis in original). Dr. Stern recommends "downsizing of these detention facilities, with priority given to those in high risk of harm due to their age and health status." Stern ¶ 11. Dr. Greifinger likewise has concluded that "[t]he most urgent need is to remove those who are medically vulnerable, and at risk of the most severe effects of COVID-19 from the heightened risk of transmission found in the congregate setting of the immigration detention facility." Greifinger ¶ 25. Dr. Keller reviewed the medical conditions that Plaintiffs report having been diagnosed with and concluded that each of them is "at risk of severe effects of COVID-19 if infected, because of their underlying medical conditions, their advanced age, or both." Keller ¶ 24.36

The release of detainees from Mesa Verde and Yuba is also important for a second reason: it reduces the risk of the spread of disease within the facilities and mitigates the possible effects on the public health systems of the surrounding communities. Reducing the population in a facility allows for greater social distancing, allows easier provision of preventive measures such as soap for handwashing and cleaning supplies for surfaces, and helps the detention staff to

Waldron (Solorio Lopez) № 19; Bahena Ortuño № 15; Patel (Quinteros) № 12-13; Martinez Lopez № 10; Joseph № 22-23; Upshaw (Lavrus) № 17; Minchaca Ramos № 17-18.

³⁶ In the event that vulnerable detainees have been exposed to CÖVID-19, these experts recommend testing where possible and releasing detainees to a quarantine setting outside of detention in coordination with local health authorities. Greifinger ¶¶ 29-30; Stern ¶ 17. Release would be appropriate *even if individuals have symptoms of COVID-19*. Released detainees could rest and recuperate at home and should not be in a congregate living situation where they expose others to potential infection. Hernandez ¶ 32.

continue to ensure detainees' safety, all of which reduce the likelihood of spread of the disease. Stern $\P 9.^{37}$ These measures therefore not only protect the remaining detainee population but also the staff and employees of ICE, who work at these facilities, along with their families and contacts. *Id.*; Greifinger $\P 21$.

Moreover, detention facilities are integral parts of the public health infrastructure of their surrounding communities. The spread of COVID-19 at Mesa Verde or Yuba will have ripple effects in the surrounding community as detainees will need intensive care at local hospitals which would "quickly become overwhelmed in the face of an infectious disease outbreak." Greifinger ¶ 19; Hernandez ¶¶ 23-25. Reducing the spread and severity of infection inside Mesa Verde and Yuba slows, if not reduces, the number of people who will become ill enough to require hospitalization, which would strain the health and economies of those medically underresourced communities. *Id*.

III. DETENTION PUTS PLAINTIFFS AT AN UNCONSTITUTIONALLY HIGH RISK OF COVID-19 AND THE EQUITIES STRONGLY FAVOR RELEASE UNDER CURRENT EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.

A. Legal Standard

On a motion for a temporary restraining order, the plaintiff "must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order standards are "substantially identical"). A temporary restraining order may likewise issue where "serious questions going to the merits [are] raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [plaintiff's] favor." All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). To succeed under the "serious question"

³⁷ See also Rich, et al., We Must Release Prisoners to Lessen the Spread of Coronavirus, The Washington Post, Mar. 17 2020 (explaining that "[i]t is essential to understand that, despite being physically secure, jails and prisons are not isolated from the community" and "people continuously enter and leave.").

test, plaintiffs must show that they are likely to suffer irreparable injury and that an injunction is in the public's interest. *Id.* at 1132.

B. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits.

1. The Constitution Protects Immigrant Detainees Against Exposure to Harmful Diseases.

Immigrant detainees, even those with prior criminal convictions, are *civil* detainees held pursuant to *civil* immigration laws. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Their constitutional protections while in custody are derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides protection significantly greater than the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.

Even the Eighth Amendment, however, imposes on the government an affirmative duty to provide conditions of reasonable health and safety to the people it holds in its custody:

[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety—it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment[.]

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). Conditions that pose an unreasonable risk of *future* harm violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, even if that harm has not yet come to pass. Thus, prison authorities cannot "ignore a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month or year." *Helling*, 509 U.S. at 33. For example, inmates cannot be comingled with others having infectious maladies such as hepatitis and venereal disease. *Hutto v. Finney*, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978); *Gates v. Collier*, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). An Eighth Amendment violation is established even though the plaintiff cannot yet "prove that he is currently suffering serious medical problems caused by" the exposure. *Helling*, 509 U.S. at 32.

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides even greater protection to civil immigrant detainees. While the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that is "cruel and unusual," the Fifth Amendment's due process protections do not allow "punishment" at all. *Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) ("Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished.").

Civil detainees are entitled to "more considerate treatment" than their criminal counterparts. *Youngberg v. Romeo*, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982); *Jones v. Blanas*, 393 F.3d 918, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, 546 U.S. 820 (2005); *See also King v. Cty. of Los Angeles*, 885 F.3d 548, 557 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding presumption of punitive, and thus unconstitutional, treatment where conditions of confinement for civil detainees are similar to those faced by pretrial criminal detainees). And while convicted persons must show "deliberate indifference" on the part of prison officials to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment, *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994), there is no such requirement for civil detainees challenging their conditions of confinement. *Jones*, 393 F.3d at 934 ("[T]o prevail on a [Due Process] claim regarding conditions of confinement, the confined individual *need not provide 'deliberate indifference'* on the part of government officials.") (emphasis added).

If placing an inmate in a situation creating an elevated risk of potentially lethal infection constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as was found in *Hutto* and *Gates*, placing a civil detainee in a situation presenting a serious risk of lethal infection is certainly unconstitutional in violation of the Fifth Amendment.³⁸

Notably, the risk of infection need not depend on a current positive test for COVID-19. *Cf. In the Matter of the Extradition of Alejandro Toledo Manrique*, 2020 WL 1307109, at *1 ("The Court is glad to hear that there are currently no reported cases of COVID-19 at Maguire, but is unsure what that means if people are not being tested. And, . . . symptoms of COVID-19 can begin to appear 2-14 days after exposure, so screening people based on observable symptoms is just a game of catch up. That's why the Bay Area is on lockdown. We don't know who's infected. Accordingly, the government's suggestion that [petitioner] should wait until there is a confirmed outbreak of COVID-19 in [the detention facility] before seeking release, . . . is impractical. By then it may be too late."); Golob ▶ 7 ("A lack of proven cases of COVID-19 in the context of a lack of testing is functionally meaningless for determining if there is a risk of COVID-19 transmission in a community or institution.").

2. The Harm to Plaintiffs from the Threat of COVID-19 is Excessive in Relation to the Government's Interest, in Violation of Substantive Due Process.

A condition of confinement for a civil immigration detainee violates the Fifth Amendment "if it imposes some harm to the detainee that significantly exceeds or is independent of the inherent discomforts of confinement and is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective or is excessive in relation to the legitimate governmental objective."
Unknown Parties v. Johnson, No. CV-15-00250-TUC-DCB, 2016 WL 8188563, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 18, 2016), aff'd sub nom. Doe v. Kelly, 878 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473-74 (2015)). As Dr. Keller concluded, Plaintiffs are each "at risk of severe effects of COVID-19 if infected, because of their underlying medical conditions, their advanced age, or both." Keller ¶ 24. The risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19 unquestionably exceeds "the inherent discomforts of confinement." Id. In normal times, crowding and close quarters, the sharing of toilets, sinks, and showers, and communal food preparation and service may be considered uncomfortable. But in light of COVID-19, these conditions present a deadly threat to Plaintiffs' lives. See supra Section II.B-E.

This threat vastly outweighs any government interest in Plaintiffs' confinement. Because immigration proceedings are civil and non-punitive, "[t]here is no sufficiently strong special justification . . . for indefinite civil detention." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. If the government's interest in effectuating removal and protecting the community cannot justify indefinite detention, it surely cannot justify the "potentially permanent" medical harm and death that Plaintiffs could face. *See id.* at 690-91; *cf. D'Alessandro v. Mukasey*, 628 F. Supp. 2d 368, 399 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (considering immigrant's age and "constellation of serious, debilitating, and progressive health problems" to weigh against flight risk concerns and interest in continued detention).

That criminal justice authorities have released masses of people from jails to prevent COVID-19 harms further indicates that Plaintiffs' confinement violates due process. *See supra* Section II.A. The relatively higher COVID-19 danger that Plaintiffs now face renders their custody unconstitutional. *See Unknown Parties v. Nielsen*, CV-15-00250-TUC-DCB, 2020 WL

813774, *7 (D. Ariz., Feb. 19, 2020) (holding that Border Patrol conditions of confinement presumptively violated due process because they were more restrictive than conditions for pretrial detainees in jails and prisons).

Plaintiffs are likely to prevail regardless of the particular detention authority that

Defendants might invoke. Even for those plaintiffs subject to "mandatory" detention under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(c), the due process violation presented by these exceptional circumstances would override any general detention mandate. *See Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (explaining U.S. Constitution's role as "supreme law of the land"); *In re Brichard Securities Litigation*, 788

F. Supp. 1098, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("[C]oncerns" about legislative intent "cannot override the Constitution."). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit recently noted in another immigration detention case that due process overrides § 1226(c) in certain common circumstances. *See Rodriguez v. Marin*, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018) ("We have grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the government's arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so."). In any event, ICE has released detainees held pursuant to § 1226(c) for humanitarian reasons, *See* Lorenzen-Strait ¶ 11, and cannot then object that such relief here would be problematic. The exceptional risk COVID-19 poses to Plaintiffs exceeds any interest Defendants might otherwise have in their detention. 40

absent the release of detainees to enable necessary social distancing and isolation. Moreover,

³⁹ Plaintiffs acknowledge that some of them have prior criminal convictions for which they have already served their criminal sentences. Plaintiffs anticipate that Defendants may seize on these convictions to argue against release, but prior convictions have no bearing on the question of whether their conditions of civil confinement violate their constitutional rights. Past convictions alone also cannot show that a person *currently* poses an "identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community." *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (finding Bail Reform Act to be constitutional on its face only because it was narrowly drawn and contained rebuttable presumptions in favor of detention for certain people accused of serious crimes, as opposed to categorical detention mandates). In any event, conditions of release could mitigate any danger Defendants might fear would be caused by release. *See infra* Section III.C.2.

⁴⁰ Another district court recently denied a TRO to immigration detainees who sought release because of COVID-19. *See Dawson v. Asher*, Case No. 20-cv-409, 2020 WL 1304557 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 19, 2020). That case was wrongly decided and rested on a materially distinguishable record. The *Dawson* court accepted ICE's claims that its preventive measures were adequate. But the DHS medical-expert whistleblowers' have since shown that those measures are insufficient

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The Court Has Authority to Order Plaintiffs' Release as the Sole **Effective Remedy for the Constitutional Violation.**

In this case, the release of Plaintiffs from detention is the only effective remedy for the constitutional violation they face. Cf. Stone v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Federal courts possess whatever powers are necessary to remedy constitutional violations because they are charged with protecting these rights."). Yesterday, the Ninth Circuit sua sponte ordered the "immediate" release of an immigration detainee, "[i]n light of the rapidly escalating public health crisis, which public health authorities predict will especially impact immigration detention centers[.]" Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, -- F.3d --, No. 18-71460 (9th Cir., March 23, 2020) (for publication).⁴¹ Here too, release is the only way to address the constitutional violations Plaintiffs face. Preventive measures that may be effective in the community, such as maintaining a distance of six feet from other persons and frequent disinfection, are simply not possible in the detention setting.

Risk mitigation is the only viable public health strategy available to limit transmission of infection, morbidity and mortality in immigration detention centers, and to decrease the likely public health impact outside of the detention centers. Even with the best-laid plans to address the spread of COVID-19 in detention facilities, the release of individuals, prioritizing the most medically vulnerable individuals, is a key part of a risk mitigation strategy.

Greifinger ¶ 22.

Release is also the typical habeas remedy. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). As the Supreme Court recently stated, a detainee may seek expedited relief from unconstitutional conditions of confinement through habeas. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1863 (2017)

The Ninth Circuit ordered the detainee's immediate release even though that person's felony criminal history would have subjected them to "mandatory" detention under § 1226(c).

Plaintiffs' declarations here show that ICE is not consistently undertaking the measures it cited in Dawson. For example, the agency is introducing new detainees into the general population without any mandatory quarantine period and not placing detainees "who meet the CDC criteria for epidemiologic risk of exposure to COVID-19 ... separately from the general population" or ensuring those exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms are placed "in a single medical housing room." See ICE Guidance on COVID-19, https://www.ice.gov/covid19. Finally, the Ninth Circuit's order in *Xochihua-Jaimes*, based on public health authorities' consensus that the escalating crisis "will especially impact immigration detention centers," directly undermines the *Dawson* court's approach of waiting for an outbreak before ordering release.

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(noting that "the habeas remedy, if necessity required its use, would have provided a faster and more direct route to relief" for detainees because "[a] successful habeas petition would have required officials to place respondents in less-restrictive conditions immediately"). Moreover, the principle that a federal court may release individuals to remedy unconstitutional conditions is well established. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011) ("When necessary to ensure compliance with a constitutional mandate, courts may enter orders placing limits on a prison's population."); Duran v. Elrod, 713 F.2d 292, 297-98 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1108 (1984) (concluding that court did not exceed its authority in directing release of low-bond pretrial detainees as necessary to reach a population cap).

Courts in this District and elsewhere have also recognized the severe harm that the risk of COVID-19 transmission poses to detainees, and released them from confinement or modified their conditions of probation accordingly. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Extradition of Alejandro Toledo Manrique, 2020 WL 1307109, at *1 (Hixson, M. J.) (ordering release of vulnerable 74year-old on bail in light of "risk of serious illness or death if he remains in custody"); United States v. Barkman, No. 3:19-cr-0052-RCJ-WGC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45628 *3, 8 (D. Nev. March 17, 2020) (modifying conditions of probation to suspend requirement of intermittent confinement where jail "simply lack[s] the resources necessary to engage in aggressive screening and testing of inmates" and concluding that "we must take every necessary action to protect vulnerable populations and the community at large"); United States v. Stephens, No. 15-cr-95 (AJN), 2020 WL 1295155, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2020) (granting reconsideration of bail determination and ordering release of criminal defendant previously found to be inappropriate for release on danger grounds because of risk posed by COVID-19 in detention); *United States v.* Raihan, No. 20-cr-68, ECF. No. 20, at 10:12-19 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2020) (continuing defendant on pretrial release rather than remanding him in part due to recognition that "[t]he more people we crowd into that facility, the more we're increasing the risk to the community").

This Court and other courts also regularly grant outright release to immigrants in civil custody when continued detention would violate their due process rights. See Jimenez v. Wolf,

No. 19-cv-07996-NC, 2020 WL1082648 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (granting motion to enforce habeas of immigrant detainee charged with drug trafficking and convicted of accessory after the fact and ordering release of petitioner with appropriate conditions of supervision); *Ramos v. Sessions*, 293 F.Supp.3d 1021, 1030-31 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2018); (same for immigrant detainee with two prior DUI convictions); *Sales v. Johnson*, No. 16-cv-01745-EDL, 2017 WL 6855827, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (same for immigrant detainee with prior second-degree murder conviction); *Judalang v. Chertoff*, 562 F.Supp.2d 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (same for immigrant detainee with prior voluntary manslaughter conviction). This case should be no different.⁴²

- C. The Remaining Factors Weigh Heavily in Favor of Granting a Temporary Restraining Order.
 - 1. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent the Temporary Restraining Order.

The Ninth Circuit has made clear that "the deprivation of constitutional rights unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The dangerous conditions of detention that Plaintiffs face also constitute irreparable harm supporting injunctive relief. *See Padilla v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement*, 387 F.Supp.3d 1219, 1231 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (recognizing that "substandard physical conditions, [and] low standards of medical care" in immigration detention constitute irreparable harm justifying injunctive relief); *See also Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining the "irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention" including the "evidence of subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention facilities"). The Ninth Circuit also has recognized that irreparable harm exists where

⁴² ICE presently has, and routinely exercises, the discretion to release particularly vulnerable individuals from custody on humanitarian grounds. Lorenzen-Strait ¶¶ 3-8; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(5); 1226(a), 1231(a)(3), 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(1). Importantly, ICE's discretion applies regardless of the statutory basis for the noncitizen's detention. *Id.* ¶ 11 ("[I]ndividuals held under mandatory detention, pursuant to [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)], were also eligible for release"). In particular, ICE has taken into consideration factors such as whether the detainees faced a heightened risk of medical harm in detention, *id.* ¶¶ 5-7, and would release individuals where appropriate medical care was not available in custody, *id.* ¶ 9.

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government actions threaten an individual's health. *See M.R. v. Dreyfus*, 663 F.3d 1100, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011), *as amended by* 697 F.3d 706 (9th Cir 2012); *Indep. Living Cent. of S. California, Inc. v. Shewry*, 543 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that Medi-Cal beneficiaries would suffer irreparable harm where new policy would limit their access to pharmaceuticals). The conditions of Plaintiffs' detention threaten not only their health, but their lives.

2. The Public Interest and Balance of Equities Weigh Heavily in Plaintiffs' Favor.

Both the balance of equities and the public interest heavily favor the Plaintiffs. "[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights." *Melendres*, 695 F.3d at 1002 (quotation omitted). Moreover, there can be no public interest in exposing vulnerable persons to increased risks of severe illness and death. "Faced with . . . preventable human suffering, [the Ninth Circuit] ha[s] little difficulty concluding that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in plaintiffs' favor." *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 996 (9th Cir. 2017) (*quoting Lopez v. Heckler*, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983)).

It is in both the Defendants' and the broader public interest to release detainees with particular medical vulnerabilities. The release of people most vulnerable to COVID-19 reduces the overall health risk for detainees and facility staff alike at Mesa Verde and Yuba. Stern ¶ 10-13; See also Allen & Rich Ltr. at 5 ("it is essential to consider releasing all detainees who do not pose an immediate risk to public safety") (emphasis in original). ICE has an interest in preventing any potential spread of COVID-19 in its detention facilities, particularly because detainees face great difficulty engaging in proper hygiene and social distancing in a detention environment. Id. ¶ 9. Immigration detention facilities face greater risk of infectious spread because of crowding, the high percentage of detained people vulnerable to serious illness in the event of COVID-19 transmission, and limited availability of medical care. Greifinger ¶ 26-27. Public health officials have explained that even with the best-laid plans, the release of vulnerable individuals is key to the risk mitigation strategy of any detention facility because it reduces the total number of detainees, allows for greater social distancing, and prevents overloading the

work of detention staff. Stern ¶¶ 11-12; Greifinger ¶ 21. Plaintiffs' release not only imposes minimal harm to the government, but also furthers ICE's interests in maintaining a healthy and orderly environment at Mesa Verde and Yuba.

Last, releasing Plaintiffs is clearly in the broader public's interest. Here, "the impact of [a temporary restraining order] reaches beyond the parties, carrying with it a potential for public consequences." *Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 996 (quotation omitted). An outbreak of COVID-19 could put significant pressure on or exceed the capacity of local health infrastructure. Stern ¶ 6. The COVID-19 outbreak has already resulted in the need for unprecedented public health measures and caused a strain on local health care systems. Greifinger ¶ 12. The release of people most vulnerable to serious illness from COVID-19 reduces the health and economic burden on the local community and health infrastructure at large. Greifinger ¶ 28; Stern ¶ 13; *See also Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 996-97 ("[T]he general public's interest in efficient allocation of the government's fiscal resources favors granting [relief]").

To the extent the equities weigh in favor of some restraint on Plaintiffs' liberty, that can be achieved through fashioning reasonable release conditions, which might include electronic monitoring. *See e.g.*, *Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 995 (finding that ICE had put forth no evidence regarding the administrative burdens of considering alternatives to detention). Such conditions are routine in both criminal and immigration release settings and are effective. A government-contracted evaluation of a program that featured monitoring instead of immigration detention reported a 99% attendance rate at all immigration court hearings and a 95% attendance rate at final hearings. *See* U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-15-26, *Alternatives to Detention: Improved Data Collection and Analyses Needed to Better Assess Program Effectiveness* 10-11 (Nov. 2014). Another program studied in 2011 saw fewer than 1% of participants removed from the program due to arrest by another law enforcement agency. *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 2016 WL 6276890, at *36-37 (U.S. 2016) (Brief of Amicus Curiae).

3. The Court Should Not Require Plaintiffs to Provide Security Prior to 1 Issuing a Temporary Restraining Order. 2 "Rule 65(c) invests the district court with discretion as to the amount of security required, 3 if any." Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). District courts routinely exercise this discretion to require no security in cases 4 brought by indigent and/or incarcerated people. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Rushen, 553 F. Supp. 5 1365, 1383 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (state prisoners); Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 6 7 385 n. 42 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (detained immigrants). This Court should do the same here. 8 IV. **CONCLUSION** 9 Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order should be granted. 10 11 Dated: March 23, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 12 /s/ William S. Freeman William S. Freeman 13 Sean Riordan Angélica Salceda 14 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF NORTHERN 15 **CALIFORNIA** 16 17 Bree Bernwanger Manohar Raju Tifanei Ressl-Moyer Public Defender 18 Hayden Rodarte Matt Gonzalez LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR Chief Attorney 19 CIVIL RIGHTS OF Francisco Ugarte SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA Genna Ellis Beier 20 Emilou H. MacLean OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 21 SAN FRANCISCO Judah Lakin Amalia Wille 22 LAKIN & WILLE LLP Attorneys for Petitioners-Plaintiffs 23 Jordan Wells 24 Stephanie Padilla Michael Kaufman 25 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN

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