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12	YEA JI SEA,	) Case No. 2:18-cv-06267
13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   23   24   25	Plaintiff,  v.  UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security; UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES; L. FRANCIS CISSNA, Director, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; DANIEL RENAUD, Associate Director, Field Operations Directorate, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services,  Defendants.	PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
26 27		
28		

1		TABLE OF CONTENTS			
2	I.	INTRODUCTION			
3   4	II.	FAC	FACTS		
5		A.	SPC	Sea's l	Honorable Service in the U.S. Army
6		D			
7		В.	Natu	ranzati	ion Through Honorable Military Service
8		C.	SPC	Sea's ]	First Naturalization Application
9		D.	SPC	Sea's (	Current Naturalization Application
10		E.	SPC	Sea is	Harmed by USCIS's Failure to Adjudicate Her
11					ion Application
12	III.	ARC	RGUMENT		
13			~ <del>~</del> ~	~ .	
14		A.			Likely to Prevail on Her APA and Act Claims
15					
16			1.		IS's Failure to Adjudicate SPC Sea's Naturalization ication Violates the APA
17					Dula of Dassey and Compressional Intent
18				a.	Rule of Reason and Congressional Intent (Factors 1 & 2)
19				1	
20				b.	Human Health and Welfare and the Interests Prejudiced by the Delay (Factors 3 & 5)
21					
22				c.	Effect on the Agency (Factor 4)
23				d.	Bad Faith (Factor 6)
24			2.	The l	Mandamus Act Requires USCIS to Adjudicate
25			_,	SPC	Sea's Naturalization Application Without
26				Unre	asonable Delay14
27		B.	SPC	Sea Sa	atisfies the Remaining Factors for Emergency Relief15
28					

1		1. S	PC Sea Will Suffer Immediate Irreparable Harm	15
2		2. T	he Balance of Equities and the Public Interest Favor	
3		S	PC Sea	17
4	IV.	CONCLUSIO	N	18
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				
	1			

1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2	Cases
3 4	Abdulmajid v. Arellano, WL 2625860 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2008)
5 6	Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011)8
7 8	Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014)16
9 10	Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)15
11 12	Daraji v. Monica, 2008 WL 183643 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2008)
13	Enyart v. Nat'l Conference of Bar Exam'rs, Inc., 630 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2011)15
14 15	Indep. Min. Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 1997)
16 17	Int'l Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 1993)17
18 19	Jiang v. Chertoff, 2008 WL 1899245 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2008)
20 21	Khan v. Johnson, 65 F. Supp. 3d 918 (C.D. Cal. 2014)10, 12, 13
22 23	Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2003)14
24	Kirwa v. United States Dep't of Def., 285 F. Supp. 3d 21 (D.D.C. 2017)passim
<ul><li>25</li><li>26</li></ul>	League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.  Connaughton,
27 28	752 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2014)17

1	Matacua v. Frank,
2	2018 WL 1838202 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2018)
3	Medina v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
4	2018 WL 2214085 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2018)
5	<i>N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton</i> ,
6	Nio v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
7	270 F. Supp. 3d 49 (D.D.C. 2017)
8	Nken v. Holder,
9	556 U.S. 418 (2009)17
10	Padilla v. Kentucky,
11	559 U.S. 356 (2010)16
12	R.I.L-R v. Johnson,   80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C., 2015)
13	
14   15	Reddy v. Mueller,   551 F. Supp. 2d 952 (N.D. Cal. 2008)11
16	Sidhu v. Chertoff,
17	2008 WL 540685 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2008)
18	Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky,
19	586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009)
20	Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2001)
21	Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC ("TRAC"),
22	750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
23	Torres v. U.S. DHS,
24	2017 WL 4340385 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017)
25	Wang v. Mukasey,
26	2008 WL 1767042 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2008)9
27	Statutes
28	5 U.S.C § 551(13)
- 1	

1	5 U.S.C. § 555	8
2	5 U.S.C. § 706(1)	8
3	8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(1)(C)	7
5	8 U.S.C. §1357	7
6	8 U.S.C. § 1440	.passim
7	8 U.S.C. § 1440(a)	3
8	8 U.S.C. § 1440(b)	4
9	8 U.S.C. § 1440f(e)(2)	11
10	8 U.S.C. § 1447(b)	10, 15
$\begin{vmatrix} 11 \\ 12 \end{vmatrix}$	8 U.S.C. § 1571(b)	10
$\begin{bmatrix} 12 \\ 13 \end{bmatrix}$	10 U.S.C. § 504(b)	2
14	28 U.S.C. § 1361	1, 14
15	Other Authorities	
16	8 C.F.R. §329.2(d)	4, 5
17	8 C.F.R. § 335.3	10
18   19	Military Personnel Citizenship Processing Act, Pub. L. 110-382, 122 Stat. 4087 (2008)	11
20 21	Alex Horton, ICE is moving to deport a veteran after Mattis assured that would not happen, Wash. Post (Apr. 5, 2018)	
22	Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)	
23   24   25	Texas Department of Public Safety, Verifying Lawful Presence, https://www.dps.texas.gov/DriverLicense/documents/verifyingLawful Presence.pdf	7
26 27 28	U.S. Army Is Discharging Immigrant Recruits Who Were Promised Citizenship, NPR (July 9, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/09/626773440/u-s-army-is-discharging-immigrant-recruits-who-were-promised-citizenship	13

1	USCIS, Check Case Processing Times, https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/
2	
3	USCIS, Citizenship Rights and Responsibilities, https://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/learners/citizenship-rights-and-
4	responsibilities
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
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11	
12	
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Case 2:18-cv-06267 Document 4-1 Filed 07/19/18 Page 7 of 25 Page ID #:31

#### I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Specialist Yea Ji Sea ("Plaintiff" or "SPC Sea") has honorably served in the U.S. Army for over four years. SPC Sea, who was born in South Korea, came to the United States in 1998 as a nine-year old and was raised in the Los Angeles area. In 2013, SPC Sea enlisted in the U.S. Army through the U.S. Department of Defense's ("DoD's") Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest ("MAVNI") program, available to noncitizens holding skills critical to the needs of the U.S. military. SPC Sea is eligible to naturalize as a U.S. citizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1440 due to her honorable service during a period of declared hostilities and her good moral character. Although she submitted a naturalization application on July 26, 2016, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") has yet to process her application. She has not even been scheduled for a naturalization examination interview. Meanwhile, the DoD is honorably discharging SPC Sea from the Army. Because she no longer has valid immigration status, SPC Sea is unable to work lawfully in the United States and is subject to arrest, detention, and deportation by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS").

USCIS's almost two-year delay in adjudicating SPC Sea's naturalization application is unreasonable in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 555, 706, and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. SPC Sea, therefore, is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims to compel USCIS to adjudicate her naturalization application expeditiously.

This case satisfies the other criteria for a Temporary Restraining Order. Absent relief, SPC Sea faces serious immediate irreparable harm because she may be arrested and detained by federal immigration authorities and placed in deportation proceedings upon her imminent honorable discharge from the U.S. Army. In addition, she is unable to work lawfully in the United States and support herself. The balance of equities and public interest are also in Plaintiff's favor, as temporary relief will simply require Defendants to comply with the law.

SPC Sea, therefore, requests this Court issue an order to require USCIS to: (1)

hold a naturalization interview for SPC Sea within ten (10) days, and to provide a final

determination on SPC Sea's naturalization application within twenty (20) days from

the filing of this Ex Parte Application for a Temporary Restraining Order.

II. FACTS

## A. SPC Sea's Honorable Service in the U.S. Army

While an applicant must typically be a lawful permanent resident ("LPR") or U.S. citizen to enlist in the U.S. military, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to enlist other persons without that status if their enlistment is vital to the national interest. *See* 10 U.S.C. § 504(b). Pursuant to that authority, in 2008, the DoD authorized the MAVNI recruitment program to enlist certain noncitizens if they are lawfully present and hold critical skills, including physicians, nurses, and experts in certain foreign languages.<sup>1</sup>

In October 2013, SPC Sea enlisted in the U.S. Army through the MAVNI program. Sea Decl. ¶ 5. SPC Sea was authorized to enlist under the MAVNI program because she was lawfully present in the United States on an F-1 student visa, could speak Korean, and was qualified to be a healthcare specialist in the U.S. Army. *Id.* In February 2014, SPC Sea began her honorable active duty service in the U.S. Army as a healthcare specialist with the rank of Private First Class ("PFC"). *Id.* ¶ 6. During her military service, SPC Sea has been stationed at Fort Sill in Oklahoma, Camp Casey in South Korea, and Fort Sam Houston in Texas, where she is currently stationed. *Id.* ¶ 7.

As a healthcare specialist, SPC Sea has served as an ambulance aid driver and a pharmacy technician, among performing other tasks. *Id.* ¶ 8. While stationed in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Kirwa v. United States Dep't of Def., 285 F. Supp. 3d 21, 29 (D.D.C. 2017) ("In 2008, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 504(b)(2), the Secretary of Defense authorized the creation of the MAVNI Pilot Program, which allowed non-citizens who were not lawful permanent residents to enlist in the United States military if it was determined that enlistment would be vital to the national interest because they were 'health care professionals' in certain specialties or possessed 'critical foreign language skills.'").

South Korea, she served in the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment (also known as the "Manchu Battalion"). *Id.* In South Korea, SPC Sea looked after the healthcare of over 800 soldiers, served as an ambulance aid and driver, and later became the only pharmacy technician for the entire Camp Casey Combined Troop Aid Station and served over 1,800 soldiers. *Id.* SPC Sea also spent countless hours of her off-time to treat injured soldiers and serve as a translator for doctors. *Id.* Because of SPC Sea's outstanding service, she has received two Army Achievement Medals from the Secretary of the Army for exceptionally meritorious service. *Id.* ¶¶ 11-13.

In September 2015, SPC Sea was promoted to Specialist. *Id.* ¶ 14. Her Certificate of Promotion stated that her "unfailing trust in superiors and loyalty to [her] peers will significantly contribute to the readiness and honor of the United States Army." *Id.* Since her promotion, SPC Sea has continued to honorably serve in the U.S. Army. At Fort Sam Houston, SPC Sea has served as a medic at the Brooke Army Medical Center. *Id.* ¶ 15. As one of SPC Sea's supervisors has written in a Character Statement: "SPC Sea has the drive and professionalism needed to bring the U.S. Army to new heights. She represents the best that the Army has to offer: a smart, agile young leader capable of handling immense challenges with marked success." *Id.* ¶ 16.

## B. Naturalization Through Honorable Military Service

The military naturalization statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1440, authorizes the naturalization of any noncitizen who has served honorably in active-duty status in the U.S. Armed Forces during a period of hostilities as designated by Executive Order if they enlisted while in the United States. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a). The United States has been designated by Executive Order as in a period of hostilities since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.<sup>2</sup>

Unlike other forms of naturalization, no age, residence, or physical presence

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Executive Order 13269—Expedited Naturalization of Aliens and Noncitizen Nationals Serving in An Active-Duty Status During the War on Terrorism, 2002 WL 1833360, at \*1.

requirements for naturalization apply to service members during a period of designated hostilities. 8 U.S.C. § 1440(b). Generally, to qualify for naturalization, a military applicant under 8 U.S.C. § 1440 must still meet other requirements, including that the applicant "[h]as been, for at least one year prior to filing the application for naturalization, and continues to be, of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and favorably disposed toward the good order and happiness of the United States." 8 C.F.R. § 329.2(d).

## C. SPC Sea's First Naturalization Application

When SPC Sea enlisted in the U.S. Army under the MAVNI program, her enlistment contract required that she apply for naturalization as soon as the Army had certified her honorable service. *Id.* ¶ 18. Therefore, in February 2014, SPC Sea filed her first N-400 naturalization application soon after entering military service. *Id.* ¶ 19.

In reviewing SPC Sea's first naturalization application, USCIS alleged that her F-1 student visa had been obtained by fraud. Specifically, SPC Sea's I-539 Application to Extend/Change Nonimmigrant Status to change her status to an F-1 student in March 2008 included an I-94 Arrival/Departure Form indicating that SPC Sea had last arrived in the United States on October 27, 2007 as a B-2 visitor. *Id.* ¶ 20. USCIS claimed that the I-94 Form was obtained fraudulently as part of a larger scheme involving the Neo-America Language School that served as the basis of SPC Sea's application. *Id.* ¶¶ 20-21. Unbeknownst to SPC Sea, in 2008, Hee Sun Shim, the owner of the Neo-America Language School, had been working with a corrupt U.S. Customs & Border Protection ("CBP") agent named Michael Anders to create false I-94 forms to allow individuals to obtain F-1 status. *Id.* ¶ 21.

SPC Sea, who was only 19 years old at the time when her I-539 application was filed, had no knowledge of the fraudulent scheme, and believed that her F-1 status had been obtained lawfully. *Id.* ¶ 22. Her I-539 application was filed by an attorney and relied on a facially valid I-94 form and official stamp in her passport created by CBP agent Anders. *Id.* The Neo-America Language School had also been approved by the

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's ("ICE's") Student and Exchange Visitor Program and had been entered into its Student and Exchange Visitor Information System. *Id.* ¶ 23. Because ICE had authorized the Neo-America Language School to enroll students in F-1 status, SPC Sea had no reason to be aware of the school's participation in the fraudulent scheme. *Id.* 

In interviews on April 2, 2014 and April 17, 2015, USCIS officers questioned SPC Sea about the I-94 form included in her I-539 application. *Id.* ¶ 24. SPC Sea was not represented by counsel in the interviews. *Id.* In the April 2, 2014 interview, SPC Sea stated that she had never given false information to any U.S. government official while applying for any immigration benefit. *Id.* ¶ 25. In the April 17, 2015 interview, SPC Sea stated that she did not provide false information during her previous interview and did not provide false information when she submitted her I-539 application. *Id.* Nervous, scared, and unaccompanied by counsel, SPC Sea stated that the I-94 form was an accurate record of a lawful entry to the United States from South Korea on October 27, 2007 even though it was not. SPC Sea regrets making that incorrect statement. *Id.* 

USCIS denied SPC Sea's naturalization application on June 4, 2015. *Id.* ¶ 26. USCIS found that SPC Sea provided false testimony during her April 2, 2014 interview when she testified that she had never previously given false information to obtain an immigration benefit. *Id.* USCIS also found that SPC Sea provided false testimony during her April 17, 2015, interview when she stated that the I-94 form was an accurate record of a lawful entry on October 27, 2007. *Id.* USCIS found that SPC Sea had not established that she was a person of "good moral character" because she gave false testimony to obtain an immigration benefit. *Id.* However, SPC Sea was permitted to apply for naturalization again, after having demonstrated "good moral character" for at least one year. *See* 8 C.F.R. §329.2(d) (stating requirement that applicant "[h]as been, for at least one year prior to filing the application for naturalization, and continues to be, of good moral character").

## D. SPC Sea's Current Naturalization Application

On July 26, 2016, SPC Sea filed her second N-400 naturalization application with USCIS's Nebraska Service Center. Sea Decl. ¶ 27. Because she was stationed at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, SPC Sea requested that her naturalization interview take place at the USCIS office in San Antonio, Texas. USCIS acknowledged receipt of her application on August 5, 2016. *Id.* On November 28, 2016, USCIS sent SPC Sea a biometrics notice to capture her biometrics and have her fingerprints cleared by the FBI. SPC Sea completed her biometrics at a USCIS office in San Antonio, Texas on December 5, 2016. *Id.* ¶ 28. Since then, and although SPC Sea's naturalization application has been pending for almost two years, Defendants have yet to schedule SPC Sea for a naturalization interview, and she has not received any additional correspondence from Defendants regarding her naturalization application. *Id.* ¶ 29.

SPC Sea continued to serve honorably in the U.S. Army, remains eligible for naturalization, and continues to be a person of "good moral character." *Id.* ¶¶ 30-31. As SPC Sea's current supervisor has written in a Character Statement: "She claims this country, the only country that she [has] known for the majority of her life. She is doing something that only one percent of the population ... has done and is continuing doing; fighting for a country that she is willing to d[ie for]....She should be granted [U.S.] citizenship for what she had done for the country, the communities and the people that she continue[s] to [have] love for, the Americans. Her ultimate goal is to become a citizen and continue to give back to the country that provide[d] her the freedom and being able to sacrifice herself for this country." *Id.* ¶ 33.

## E. SPC Sea is Harmed by USCIS's Failure to Adjudicate Her Naturalization Application

USCIS's failure to adjudicate SPC Sea's naturalization application has caused her serious immediate irreparable harm. On June 21, 2018, the U.S. Army initiated a separation action against SPC Sea. *Id.* ¶ 36. The U.S. Army alleged that she improperly enlisted in the U.S. Army through the MAVNI program because her F-1

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27 28 <sup>3</sup> See Texas Department of Public Safety, Verifying Lawful Presence, https://www.dps.texas.gov/DriverLicense/documents/verifyingLawfulPresence.pdf.

SPC Sea's military service be characterized as Honorable. *Id.* On July 19, 2018, the U.S. Army made a final determination on the separation action against SPC Sea, and she is being honorably discharged from the Army. *Id.* ¶ 37.

status was not valid prior to enlisting. *Id.* The separation action recommended that

SPC Sea requires emergency relief because she is being honorably discharged from the Army without any valid immigration status. *Id.* ¶¶ 37-38. While serving in the U.S. Army as a Specialist, SPC Sea has received a salary of about \$2,270.50 per month. *Id.* ¶ 17. Because she currently lives on base at Fort Sam Houston, SPC Sea is also provided free housing by the U.S. Army. *Id.* Since SPC Sea is being honorably discharged without valid immigration status, she will be unable to work lawfully in the United States and support herself. *Id.* ¶ 38. She no longer will receive a salary and free housing from the U.S. Army. *Id.* She will also be unable to obtain a driver's license where she is currently stationed in Texas.<sup>3</sup> Id. She is subject to arrest, detention, and deportation by immigration authorities. See, e.g., id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C); 8 U.S.C. §1357. Furthermore, by unreasonably delaying SPC Sea's statutory right to naturalize, USCIS has prevented her from enjoying other rights and responsibilities of U.S. citizenship, including the opportunity to live and work in the United States as a U.S. citizen, to travel freely as a U.S. citizen, to vote in elections, and to serve on juries.<sup>4</sup>

#### III. **ARGUMENT**

A motion for a temporary restraining order should be issued if "immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or irreversible damage will result" to the applicant if the order does not issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).

The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is the same as the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain a preliminary

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See USCIS, Citizenship Rights and Responsibilities, https://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/learners/citizenship-rights-and-responsibilities.

injunction. Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

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(2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). "A preliminary injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates . . . that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor." Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 97 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).

As set forth below, USCIS's failure to adjudicate SPC Sea's naturalization application violates the APA and Mandamus Act, and SPC Sea will suffer serious immediate irreparable harm absent emergency relief.

#### Α. SPC Sea is Likely to Prevail on Her APA and Mandamus Act Claims

#### USCIS's Failure to Adjudicate SPC Sea's Naturalization 1. Application Violates the APA

The APA requires administrative agencies to conclude matters presented to them "within a reasonable time." 5 U.S.C. § 555. A district court reviewing agency action may "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonable delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). "Agency action" includes, in relevant part, "an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 5 U.S.C § 551(13); see Compl. ¶¶ 65-68.

Courts have consistently found that the APA "establish[es] a duty on the part of USCIS to adjudicate N-400 applications within a reasonable time frame." Abdulmajid v. Arellano, No. CV 08-796-GHK VBKX, 2008 WL 2625860, at \*2 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2008); see also Sidhu v. Chertoff, No. 1:07CV1188AWISMS, 2008 WL 540685, at \*5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2008) (holding that, under the APA, USCIS "has a nondiscretionary duty to act on [naturalization] applications before it by processing them"); Jiang v. Chertoff, No. C08-00332 SI, 2008 WL 1899245, at \*3 (N.D. Cal.

Apr. 28, 2008) ("[T]he APA . . . establish[es] a clear and certain right to have applications adjudicated, and to have them adjudicated within a reasonable time frame."); *Wang v. Mukasey*, No. C-07-06266RMW, 2008 WL 1767042, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2008) (same).

Courts in the Ninth Circuit generally apply the *TRAC* factors in deciding whether to order relief in claims of agency delay brought under the APA. *Indep. Min. Co. v. Babbitt*, 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997). The *TRAC* factors are: "(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a 'rule of reason'[;] (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason [;] (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake [;] (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority[;] (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by the delay[;] and (6) the court need not 'find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed." *Id.* at 511 n.7 (quoting *Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC ("TRAC")*, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

All of the *TRAC* factors support the determination that USCIS has unreasonably delayed SPC Sea's naturalization application by failing to adjudicate the application for almost two years despite the fact that military naturalization applications should be processed on an expedited basis.

## a. Rule of Reason and Congressional Intent (Factors 1 & 2)

The first two *TRAC* factors weigh strongly in SPC Sea's favor. Congress has generally stated "that the processing of an immigration benefit application," which includes naturalization, "should be completed not later than 180 days after the initial filing of the application." 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b). While this statute does not include a

mandatory timetable for processing naturalization applications, courts have found it "highly relevant" when determining the reasonableness of a delay. *Khan v. Johnson*, 65 F. Supp. 3d 918, 930 (C.D. Cal. 2014); *see also Daraji v. Monica*, No. CIV.A. 07-1749, 2008 WL 183643, at \*5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2008) (noting that "the 180-day timetable may provide the Court with general guidance"). Furthermore, USCIS is required to grant or deny a naturalization application within 120 days of the date of the naturalization interview. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b); 8 C.F.R. § 335.3. Courts have also found this timeframe relevant, even where, as here, the applicant has yet to be scheduled for an interview. *See Daraji*, 2008 WL 183643, at \*5 ("The 120-day rule articulated in Section 1447(b) also provides some guidance to the Court regarding what constitutes a reasonable period for USCIS to adjudicate a naturalization application.").

Under federal law and policies, military naturalization applications are required to be processed on an expedited basis. Executive Order 13269, which authorizes SPC Sea's naturalization under 8 U.S.C. §1440, is titled "Expedited Naturalization of Aliens and Noncitizen Nationals Serving in An Active-Duty Status During the War on Terrorism" and was issued by President George W. Bush "solely in order to provide expedited naturalization for aliens and noncitizen nationals serving in an active-duty status in the Armed Forces of the United States." Executive Order 13269—Expedited Naturalization of Aliens and Noncitizen Nationals Serving in An Active-Duty Status During the War on Terrorism, 2002 WL 1833360, at \*1 (July 3, 2002). The U.S. Army's own published guidance that "explains the procedures for Soldiers to apply for citizenship" expressly notes that "[t]he goal is to streamline and expedite the handling of their applications." Kirwa v. United States Dep't of Def., 285 F. Supp. 3d 21, 28 (D.D.C. 2017).

Indeed, until the provision sunset in 2013, Congress had mandated that, within six months of receiving a military naturalization application under 8 U.S.C. §1440, USCIS was required to "process and adjudicate the application" or "provide the

applicant with ... an explanation for its inability to meet the processing and adjudication deadline [and] an estimate of the date by which the application will be processed and adjudicated." Military Personnel Citizenship Processing Act, Pub. L. 110-382, 122 Stat. 4087 (2008). Even today, for military applicants on active duty serving abroad, Congress requires that their naturalization applications "receive expedited processing and are adjudicated within 180 days of the receipt of responses to all background checks." 8 U.S.C. § 1440f(e)(2).

USCIS has also had a policy to expedite the naturalization applications of MAVNI enlistees like SPC Sea. As a standard term of their enlistment contracts, MAVNI enlistees (including SPC Sea) agreed "to apply for U.S. citizenship as soon as the Army has certified [their] honorable service." *Kirwa*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 31; Sea Decl. ¶ 18. In conjunction with the U.S. Army, USCIS established the "Naturalization at Basic Training Initiative" in order to "provide expedited processing of naturalization applications for non-citizen enlistees" once they arrived at basic training with the goal that MAVNI recruits be naturalized before basic training completed. *Kirwa*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 29. In July 2016, when SPC Sea filed her naturalization application, basic training "would be completed in ten to twelve weeks," and by the end of that time period "USCIS would have adjudicated their N-400 naturalization applications, and the MAVNIs would be granted citizenship." *Id.* at 31.

For civilian applicants for naturalization and other immigration benefits, many courts have found delays of "around two years" "presumptively unreasonable as a matter of law under *TRAC*." *Daraji*, 2008 WL 183643, at \*5 (citing cases); *see also Reddy v. Mueller*, 551 F. Supp. 2d 952, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ("[W]here a naturalization application has been pending for two years (as is the case here), it is appropriate to remand the case with instructions to adjudicate by a particular deadline[.]"). In the normal course of business in the USCIS Field Office in San Antonio, Texas—where SPC Sea requested her naturalization interview take place—USCIS's website represents that the current estimated time range for processing

naturalization applications is between 4.5 to 16.5 months.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, even if SPC Sea had submitted a civilian naturalization application, it should have been adjudicated within 16.5 months at the latest, according to USCIS's own processing times. Because SPC Sea has filed a military naturalization application based on her years of honorably service in the U.S. Army, her application should have received expedited treatment and have been adjudicated much sooner, and the two-year delay is unreasonable under the first two TRAC factors.

#### b. Human Health and Welfare and the Interests Prejudiced by the Delay (Factors 3 & 5)

Courts analyzing delays in adjudicating immigration benefits "often analyze [the] third and fifth factors together." Khan, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 930. These factors also weigh heavily in favor of Plaintiff. There are serious human health and welfare issues at stake for SPC Sea, and her interests have been significantly prejudiced by the delay. By failing to adjudicate her naturalization application, USCIS has caused significant harm to SPC Sea, as she has no lawful immigration status, is not able to work lawfully in the United States, is not able to obtain a driver's license where she is stationed in Texas, and is subject to arrest, detention, and deportation by immigration authorities. See Sea Decl. ¶¶ 37-38. She also cannot partake in other benefits of U.S. citizenship, including to travel freely as a U.S. citizen, to vote in elections, and to serve on juries. For these and similar reasons, courts have consistently found that factors 3 and 5

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See USCIS, Check Case Processing Times, https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/. USCIS's own data indicates that the San Antonio Field Office processes military naturalization applications more quickly than other naturalization application and today, it has significantly reduced the number of pending military naturalization applications, even as the backlog of other naturalization applications has increased. Compare USCIS Military and Non-Military Naturalization Form N-400 Performance Data Fiscal Year 2016, 3rd Qtr, at 3 (Sept. 13, 2016) (indicating that the San Antonio Field Office received 215 military naturalization applications, approved 248, and had 387 pending), with USCIS Military and Non-Military Naturalization Form N-400 Performance Data Fiscal Year 2018, 2nd Qtr, at 3 (July 17, 2018) (indicating that the San Antonio Field Office received 24 military naturalization applications, approved 57, denied 14, and had 272 pending), available at https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/immigration-forms-data/data-set-form-n-400-application-naturalization.

weigh in favor of the applicant in naturalization delay cases. *See, e.g., Khan*, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 930-31 ("[P]laintiffs' interests in pursuing ... citizenship, or at least a final determination on their application so as to end a stressful waiting period, are compelling[.]"); *Daraji*, 2008 WL 183643, at \*6 (noting that Plaintiffs "are barred from applying for any jobs which require United States citizenship" and "cannot partake in the benefits of citizenship, such as voting and jury service").

## c. Effect on the Agency (Factor 4)

The fourth *TRAC* factor also weighs heavily in favor of Plaintiff. Here, there is no "higher or competing priority" on USCIS's activities that would be affected by expediting SPC Sea's naturalization application. Indeed, because SPC Sea filed a military naturalization application under 8 U.S.C. §1440, USCIS should have already expedited her application, but has failed to do so. *See supra* pp. 10-11; *see also Khan*, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 931-32 (noting that the fourth factor weighs in a plaintiff's favor where he "merely seeks a ruling on his Application . . . and does not otherwise seek to change the USCIS policy") (internal citation omitted).

## d. Bad Faith (Factor 6)

Finally, the sixth *TRAC* factor also weighs in favor of SPC Sea. While a court "need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed," *TRAC*, 750 F.2d at 80, the delay in SPC Sea's case fits a troublesome pattern where the Government has unlawfully delayed and prevented MAVNI enlistees, like SPC Sea, from obtaining U.S. citizenship. For example, in October 2017, the DoD attempted to institute a new policy to create additional restrictions to prevent MAVNI enlistees from naturalizing on an expedited basis. In *Kirwa*, the court struck down that policy, finding that it unreasonably delayed the expedited citizenship that MAVNI recruits are entitled to. *See Kirwa*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 42. More recently, news reports indicate that the DoD is discharging

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MAVNI recruits in an attempt to prevent them from obtaining U.S. citizenship.<sup>6</sup> This impropriety "lurking behind" Defendants' decision to unreasonably delay SPC Sea's naturalization application weighs in favor of granting SPC Sea's APA claim.

For these reasons, SPC Sea is likely to succeed on the merits of her APA claim.

## 2. The Mandamus Act Requires USCIS to Adjudicate SPC Sea's Naturalization Application Without Unreasonable Delay

The Mandamus Act provides district courts with mandamus power "to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Courts may grant mandamus relief ordering an agency to act under the Mandamus Act if the three elements of the general mandamus test are satisfied: "(1) the individual's claim is clear and certain; (2) the official's duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt, and (3) no other adequate remedy is available." *Kildare v. Saenz*, 325 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003).

SPC Sea has met the three elements of the mandamus test. First, her claim is clear and certain: she requests this Court to grant mandamus relief to compel USCIS to adjudicate her naturalization application. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 69-73. Second, courts have routinely found that USCIS has a nondiscretionary and ministerial duty to adjudicate naturalization applications within a reasonable time frame. *See*, *e.g.*, *Abdulmajid*, 2008 WL 2625860, at \*1-2 (holding that "the citizenship regulations establish a duty on the part of USCIS to adjudicate N-400 applications within a reasonable time frame"); *Sidhu*, 2008 WL 540685, at \*8 (holding "that Defendants have a clear and non-discretionary duty to adjudicate Plaintiff's N-400 application within a certain time period"); *Jiang*, 2008 WL 1899245, at \*5 (same). When determining whether a delay is unreasonable under the Mandamus Act, courts have "construed a claim seeking mandamus . . . , 'in essence,' as one for relief under § 706

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See, e.g., Vanessa Romo, *U.S. Army Is Discharging Immigrant Recruits Who Were Promised Citizenship*, NPR (July 9, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/09/626773440/u-s-army-is-discharging-immigrant-recruits-who-were-promised-citizenship.

of the APA." *Babbitt*, 105 F.3d at 507 (quoting *Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y*, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n. 4 (1986)). Therefore, for the same reasons that the delay of SPC Sea's naturalization application is unreasonable under the APA, it is also unreasonable under the Mandamus Act. *See supra* pp. 8-14. Finally, SPC Sea does not have another adequate remedy available to her, as the naturalization statutes only provide for a remedy for delays after USCIS has held a naturalization interview. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). SPC Sea has yet to have an interview scheduled.

For these reasons, SPC Sea is likely to succeed on the merits of her Mandamus Act claim.

# B. SPC Sea Satisfies the Remaining Factors for Emergency Relief SPC Sea easily satisfies the remaining factors for issuance of a temporary

restraining order. See Stormans, Inc., 586 F.3d at 1127.

## 1. SPC Sea Will Suffer Immediate Irreparable Harm

SPC Sea will suffer immediate irreparable harm in the absence of emergency relief because SPC Sea is being honorably discharged from the U.S. Army without valid immigration status because of USCIS's failure to adjudicate her naturalization application.

Courts have held that "delaying naturalization applications after applicants have been promised an expedited path to citizenship constitutes irreparable harm." *Kirwa*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 42 (citing *Nio v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 270 F. Supp. 3d 49, 63 (D.D.C. 2017); *Hamandi v. Chertoff*, 550 F. Supp. 2d 46, 51 (D.D.C. 2008); *Vargas v. Meese*, 682 F. Supp. 591, 595 (D.D.C. 1987)). Like the plaintiffs in *Kirwa*, SPC Sea's naturalization application has been unreasonably delayed by Defendants after she was promised an expedited path to citizenship as a MAVNI recruit.

Furthermore, because SPC Sea has no valid immigration status, she is not able to lawfully work in the United States. She is losing her military salary of about \$2,270.50 per month and free housing, and, because of USCIS's unreasonable delay,

will not be able to obtain another job to pay for her basic necessities. *See*, *e.g.*, *Enyart v. Nat'l Conference of Bar Exam'rs*, *Inc.*, 630 F.3d 1153, 1165 (9th Cir. 2011) (The "loss of opportunity to pursue [one's] chosen profession" constitutes irreparable harm.); *Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill*, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) ("We have frequently recognized the severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood."); *Torres v. U.S. DHS*, No. 17CV1840 JM (NLS), 2017 WL 4340385 at \*6-7, (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017) ("The potential harm caused by Defendants' conduct includes the loss of employment, [which] impacts Plaintiff's ability to financially provide for himself...").<sup>7</sup>

SPC Sea is also subject to arrest, detention, and deportation by federal immigration authorities. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (describing "[t]he severity of deportation" as "the equivalent of banishment or exile"). In *Nio*, the court found that the plaintiffs established irreparable harm where they "have lost their lawful immigration status during the delay and have no legal protection from removal and deportation proceedings." Nio, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 63. The court noted that the "plaintiffs enlisted in the MAVNI program . . . with the clear understanding, based on the explicit representations of the government, that they would become naturalized citizens, not illegal immigrants." *Id.* SPC Sea is in the exact same situation: she enlisted under the MAVNI program based on representations that she would become a naturalized citizen, and USCIS has unreasonably delayed her ability to do so. See also Kirwa, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 43 (finding irreparable harm where "every day of delay leaves plaintiffs in limbo and in fear of removal. Plaintiffs live in constant fear that they will . . . be discharged, deported, and subject to harsh punishment in their country of origin for joining a foreign military.").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> SPC Sea also is unable to obtain a driver's license in Texas, where she is currently based, further limiting her ability to obtain work opportunities. *See Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer*, 757 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Plaintiffs' inability to obtain driver's licenses likely causes them irreparable harm by limiting their professional opportunities.").

SPC Sea's fear of removal is not speculative as USCIS "is blocking access to an

1 2 existing legal avenue for avoiding removal," namely the adjudication of her naturalization application. Id. Indeed, ICE has represented that it will consider 3 initiating removal proceedings against MAVNI enlistees once they no longer 4 "demonstrate active participation in the MAVNI program." *Id.* at 43-44. In a case 5 similar to SPC Sea's situation, ICE did just that. The MAVNI soldier was honorably 6 7 discharged for allegedly enlisting using a fraudulent student visa. ICE arrested the MAVNI soldier at his military base upon discharge, detained him for three weeks, and 8 commenced removal proceedings against him.<sup>8</sup> The fact that SPC Sea is subject to the 9 same harms because of her honorable discharge demonstrates her eligibility for 10 emergency relief. See, e.g., Matacua v. Frank, No. 18-cv-462, 2018 WL 1838202, at 11 \*3 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2018) (noting that "loss of liberty" is "perhaps the best example 12 of irreparable harm"). 13

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2. The Balance of Equities and the Public Interest Favor SPC Sea

The balance of equities and the public interest also strongly favor SPC Sea. The remaining two factors—balance of hardships and the public interest—merge when, as here, the government is the opposing party. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). In balancing equities, courts "balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief." N. Chevenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836, 843-44 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts weigh various factors that may contribute to the potential injury to both parties, such as "the relative size and strength of each [party]" and the "duration of harm." Int'l Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 827 (9th Cir. 1993); League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Connaughton, 752 F.3d 755, 765 (9th Cir. 2014).

Here, the equities strongly favor SPC Sea. "The public interest is served when

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Alex Horton, *ICE is moving to deport a veteran after Mattis assured that would not happen*, Wash. Post (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2018/04/04/mattis-said-immigrant-veterans-should-not-be-deported-ice-is-trying-anyway/

administrative agencies comply with their obligations under the APA." *R.I.L-R v. Johnson*, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 191 (D.D.C. 2015); *see also Medina v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. C17-0218RSM, 2018 WL 2214085, at \*12 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2018) ("Public interest exists in ensuring that the government complies with its obligations under the law and follows its own procedures."). Therefore, the public interest is served by ensuring that USCIS complies with the APA and adjudicates SPC Sea's naturalization application in a timely fashion. Moreover, given that SPC Sea will suffer immediate irreparable harm because of USCIS's delay, and USCIS has provided no justification for its delay, the equities strongly weigh in favor of granting relief. *See Kirwa*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 44 (concluding that the balance of equities favor the plaintiffs where they "will continue to suffer[] irreparable harm due to DOD's inaction" and "defendants have not offered sufficient justification for their policy change").

#### IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant a temporary restraining order requiring USCIS to: (1) hold a naturalization interview for SPC Sea within ten (10) days, and (2) to provide a final determination on SPC Sea's naturalization application within twenty (20) days from the filing of this Ex Parte Application for a Temporary Restraining Order.

21 Respectfully submitted,

ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Dated: July 19, 2018

/s/ Sameer Ahmed
SAMEER AHMED

Counsel for Plaintiff