

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Civil Division

Southwest District, Torrance Courthouse, Department M

21STCP04167

**AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA vs INGLEWOOD POLICE DEPARTMENT**

November 20, 2025

2:43 PM

Judge: Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka
Judicial Assistant: J. Ahn
Courtroom Assistant: None

CSR: None
ERM: None
Deputy Sheriff: None

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff(s): No Appearances

For Defendant(s): No Appearances

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Ruling on Submitted Matter

The Court, having taken the matter under submission on 11/12/2025 for Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, now rules as follows:

1. American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, et al.'s Motion for Summary Judgment

COURT RULING

American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, et al.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Background

Petitioners filed the Petition for Writ of Mandate on December 23, 2021. Petitioners/Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Petition on September 8, 2022. Petitioners allege the following facts. Petitioners allege that Respondents have failed to comply with the California Public Records Act (the "CPRA"). Petitioners allege that they attempted to exercise their rights under the CPRA to obtain records from Respondents regarding police officer misconduct. Petitioners allege that Respondents failed to comply. The first two causes of action for Writ of Mandate were adjudicated on July 21, 2023. The petition for writ of mandate was granted. The third and fourth causes of action for Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief remain.

Request for Judicial Notice

Petitioners/Plaintiffs' request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(c) and (h).

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Objections

Respondents/Defendants' objections:

Declaration of Chandra Bhatnagar –
Objections 1 and 2 are overruled.

Declaration of Tiffany Bailey –
Objections 3 to 33 are overruled. Typically, an attorney may not have personal knowledge to speak first-hand to relevant facts of an action. The instant action, however, is distinct in that it involves an attempt to obtain documents and records to which the declarant has established personal knowledge and foundation for her statements reflecting those attempts.

Declaration of Madelyn E. Coles –
Objections 34 to 70 are overruled. The Court simply comments that these objections are incredibly boilerplate and not well articulated.

Declaration of Stephanie Padilla –
Objections 71 to 254 are overruled. The Court refers the parties to the comments mentioned with respect to the declaration of Tiffany Bailey.

Petitioners/Plaintiffs' Objections:

Declaration of Victor I. King –
Objections 1 to 4, and 9 are overruled. Objections 5 to 8 are sustained.

Declaration of Lt. Scott Collins –
Objections 10 to 26 are overruled.

Motion for Summary Judgment

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

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judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” CCP § 437c(p)(2). “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” CCP § 437c(p)(2). “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 463, 467.

“A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1).

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; CCP § 437c(c).)

“Plaintiffs-Petitioners American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California (hereafter “ACLU”) and Trisha Shanklin [move], pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c, for an order granting summary judgment on their (1) third cause of action for declaratory relief that the Inglewood Police Department has engaged in conduct that violates the statutory deadline, production, and notice requirements of the California Public Records Act; and (2) fourth cause of action for injunctive relief prohibiting this conduct and compelling prospective compliance. [¶] Summary judgment on Plaintiffs-Petitioners’ declaratory and injunctive relief claims is appropriate because the undisputed facts show that Defendants have a pattern and practice of failing to comply with their statutory obligations under the California Public Records Act, Government Code § 7920.00 et seq., Penal Code § 832.7, and Article I, § 3(b) of the California Constitution.” (Notice of Motion, p. 2, lines 5-16).

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Third Cause Action for Declaratory Relief for Violation of the California Public Records Act
Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq., Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 526a, 1060

Fourth Cause of Action for Injunctive Relief for Violation of the California Public Records Act
Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq., Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 526a, 1085, Civ. Code, § 3422

“Endorsing the proposition “that access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state[.]” the Legislature enacted the PRA for the purpose of increasing freedom of information by giving members of the public access to information in the possession of public agencies.' [Citation.] Legislative policy favors disclosure. [Citation.] All public records are subject to disclosure unless the Public Records Act expressly provides otherwise. American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California v. Superior Court (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55, 66 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Gov. Code, § 7922.530 states:

“(a) Except with respect to public records exempt from disclosure by express provisions of law, each state or local agency, upon a request for a copy of records that reasonably describes an identifiable record or records, shall make the records promptly available to any person upon payment of fees covering direct costs of duplication, or a statutory fee if applicable. Upon request, an exact copy shall be provided unless impracticable to do so.”

Gov. Code, § 7922.535 states:

“(a) Each agency, upon a request for a copy of records, shall, within 10 days from receipt of the request, determine whether the request, in whole or in part, seeks copies of disclosable public records in the possession of the agency and shall promptly notify the person making the request of the determination and the reasons therefor. If the agency determines that the request seeks disclosable public records, the agency shall also state the estimated date and time when the records will be made available.”

Pen. Code, § 832.7 states, in relevant part:

“(b)(1) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), Section 7923.600 of the Government Code, or any other law, the following peace officer or custodial officer personnel records and records maintained by a state or local agency shall not be confidential and shall be made available for public inspection pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1 of the Government Code):

(A) A record relating to the report, investigation, or findings of any of the following:

(i) An incident involving the discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace officer or custodial

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officer.

(ii) An incident involving the use of force against a person by a peace officer or custodial officer that resulted in death or in great bodily injury.

(iii) A sustained finding involving a complaint that alleges unreasonable or excessive force.

(iv) A sustained finding that an officer failed to intervene against another officer using force that is clearly unreasonable or excessive.

(B)(i) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency that a peace officer or custodial officer engaged in sexual assault involving a member of the public.

(ii) As used in this subparagraph, "sexual assault" means the commission or attempted initiation of a sexual act with a member of the public by means of force, threat, coercion, extortion, offer of leniency or other official favor, or under the color of authority. For purposes of this definition, the propositioning for or commission of any sexual act while on duty is considered a sexual assault.

(iii) As used in this subparagraph, "member of the public" means any person not employed by the officer's employing agency and includes any participant in a cadet, explorer, or other youth program affiliated with the agency.

(C) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency involving dishonesty by a peace officer or custodial officer directly relating to the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of a crime, or directly relating to the reporting of, or investigation of misconduct by, another peace officer or custodial officer, including, but not limited to, any false statements, filing false reports, destruction, falsifying, or concealing of evidence, or perjury.

(D) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency that a peace officer or custodial officer engaged in conduct including, but not limited to, verbal statements, writings, online posts, recordings, and gestures, involving prejudice or discrimination against a person on the basis of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or military and veteran status.

(E) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency that the peace officer made an unlawful arrest or conducted an unlawful search.

(2) Records that are subject to disclosure under clause (iii) or (iv) of subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1), or under subparagraph (D) or (E) of paragraph (1), relating to an incident that occurs before January 1, 2022, shall not be subject to the time limitations in paragraph (11) until January 1, 2023.

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(3) Records that shall be released pursuant to this subdivision include all investigative reports; photographic, audio, and video evidence; transcripts or recordings of interviews; autopsy reports; all materials compiled and presented for review to the district attorney or to any person or body charged with determining whether to file criminal charges against an officer in connection with an incident, whether the officer's action was consistent with law and agency policy for purposes of discipline or administrative action, or what discipline to impose or corrective action to take; documents setting forth findings or recommended findings; and copies of disciplinary records relating to the incident, including any letters of intent to impose discipline, any documents reflecting modifications of discipline due to the Skelly or grievance process, and letters indicating final imposition of discipline or other documentation reflecting implementation of corrective action. Records that shall be released pursuant to this subdivision also include records relating to an incident specified in paragraph (1) in which the peace officer or custodial officer resigned before the law enforcement agency or oversight agency concluded its investigation into the alleged incident.

(4) A record from a separate and prior investigation or assessment of a separate incident shall not be released unless it is independently subject to disclosure pursuant to this subdivision.

(5) If an investigation or incident involves multiple officers, information about allegations of misconduct by, or the analysis or disposition of an investigation of, an officer shall not be released pursuant to subparagraph (B), (C), (D), or (E) of paragraph (1), unless it relates to a sustained finding regarding that officer that is itself subject to disclosure pursuant to this section. However, factual information about that action of an officer during an incident, or the statements of an officer about an incident, shall be released if they are relevant to a finding against another officer that is subject to release pursuant to subparagraph (B), (C), (D), or (E) of paragraph (1).

(6) An agency shall redact a record disclosed pursuant to this section only for any of the following purposes:

(A) To remove personal data or information, such as a home address, telephone number, or identities of family members, other than the names and work-related information of peace and custodial officers.

(B) To preserve the anonymity of whistleblowers, complainants, victims, and witnesses.

(C) To protect confidential medical, financial, or other information of which disclosure is specifically prohibited by federal law or would cause an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy that clearly outweighs the strong public interest in records about possible misconduct and use of force by peace officers and custodial officers.

(D) Where there is a specific, articulable, and particularized reason to believe that disclosure of the record would pose a significant danger to the physical safety of the peace officer, custodial officer, or another person.

(7) Notwithstanding paragraph (6), an agency may redact a record disclosed pursuant to this

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section, including personal identifying information, where, on the facts of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the information clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the information.

(8) An agency may withhold a record of an incident described in paragraph (1) that is the subject of an active criminal or administrative investigation, in accordance with any of the following:

(A)(i) During an active criminal investigation, disclosure may be delayed for up to 60 days from the date the misconduct or use of force occurred or until the district attorney determines whether to file criminal charges related to the misconduct or use of force, whichever occurs sooner. If an agency delays disclosure pursuant to this clause, the agency shall provide, in writing, the specific basis for the agency's determination that the interest in delaying disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure. This writing shall include the estimated date for disclosure of the withheld information.

(ii) After 60 days from the misconduct or use of force, the agency may continue to delay the disclosure of records or information if the disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with a criminal enforcement proceeding against an officer who engaged in misconduct or used the force. If an agency delays disclosure pursuant to this clause, the agency shall, at 180-day intervals as necessary, provide, in writing, the specific basis for the agency's determination that disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with a criminal enforcement proceeding. The writing shall include the estimated date for the disclosure of the withheld information. Information withheld by the agency shall be disclosed when the specific basis for withholding is resolved, when the investigation or proceeding is no longer active, or by no later than 18 months after the date of the incident, whichever occurs sooner.

(iii) After 60 days from the misconduct or use of force, the agency may continue to delay the disclosure of records or information if the disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with a criminal enforcement proceeding against someone other than the officer who engaged in the misconduct or used the force. If an agency delays disclosure under this clause, the agency shall, at 180-day intervals, provide, in writing, the specific basis why disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with a criminal enforcement proceeding, and shall provide an estimated date for the disclosure of the withheld information. Information withheld by the agency shall be disclosed when the specific basis for withholding is resolved, when the investigation or proceeding is no longer active, or by no later than 18 months after the date of the incident, whichever occurs sooner, unless extraordinary circumstances warrant continued delay due to the ongoing criminal investigation or proceeding. In that case, the agency must show by clear and convincing evidence that the interest in preventing prejudice to the active and ongoing criminal investigation or proceeding outweighs the public interest in prompt disclosure of records about misconduct or use of force by peace officers and custodial officers. The agency shall release all information subject to disclosure that does not cause substantial prejudice, including any

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documents that have otherwise become available.

(iv) In an action to compel disclosure brought pursuant to Section 7923.000 of the Government Code, an agency may justify delay by filing an application to seal the basis for withholding, in accordance with Rule 2.550 of the California Rules of Court, or any successor rule, if disclosure of the written basis itself would impact a privilege or compromise a pending investigation.

(B) If criminal charges are filed related to the incident in which misconduct occurred or force was used, the agency may delay the disclosure of records or information until a verdict on those charges is returned at trial or, if a plea of guilty or no contest is entered, the time to withdraw the plea pursuant to Section 1018.

(C) During an administrative investigation into an incident described in paragraph (1), the agency may delay the disclosure of records or information until the investigating agency determines whether the misconduct or use of force violated a law or agency policy, but no longer than 180 days after the date of the employing agency's discovery of the misconduct or use of force, or allegation of misconduct or use of force, by a person authorized to initiate an investigation.

(9) A record of a complaint, or the investigations, findings, or dispositions of that complaint, shall not be released pursuant to this section if the complaint is frivolous, as defined in Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or if the complaint is unfounded.

(10) The cost of copies of records subject to disclosure pursuant to this subdivision that are made available upon the payment of fees covering direct costs of duplication pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 7922.530 of the Government Code shall not include the costs of searching for, editing, or redacting the records.

(11) Except to the extent temporary withholding for a longer period is permitted pursuant to paragraph (8), records subject to disclosure under this subdivision shall be provided at the earliest possible time and no later than 45 days from the date of a request for their disclosure.

(12)(A) For purposes of releasing records pursuant to this subdivision, the lawyer-client privilege does not prohibit the disclosure of either of the following:

(i) Factual information provided by the public entity to its attorney or factual information discovered in any investigation conducted by, or on behalf of, the public entity's attorney.

(ii) Billing records related to the work done by the attorney so long as the records do not relate to active and ongoing litigation and do not disclose information for the purpose of legal consultation between the public entity and its attorney.

(B) This paragraph does not prohibit the public entity from asserting that a record or information within the record is exempted or prohibited from disclosure pursuant to any other federal or state law.

(13) Notwithstanding subdivision (a) or any other law, an agency that formerly employed a peace officer or custodial officer may, without receiving a request for disclosure, disclose to the

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public the termination for cause of that officer by that agency for any disclosable incident, including those described in subparagraphs (A) to (E), inclusive, of paragraph (1). Any such disclosure shall be at the discretion of the agency and shall not include any information otherwise prohibited from disclosure. This paragraph is declaratory of existing law.”

Code Civ. Proc., § 526a states:

“(a) An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a local agency, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a resident therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax that funds the defendant local agency, including, but not limited to, the following:

- (1) An income tax.
- (2) A sales and use tax or transaction and use tax initially paid by a consumer to a retailer.
- (3) A property tax, including a property tax paid by a tenant or lessee to a landlord or lessor pursuant to the terms of a written lease.
- (4) A business license tax.

(b) This section does not affect any right of action in favor of a local agency, or any public officer; provided, that no injunction shall be granted restraining the offering for sale, sale, or issuance of any municipal bonds for public improvements or public utilities.

(c) An action brought pursuant to this section to enjoin a public improvement project shall take special precedence over all civil matters on the calendar of the court except those matters to which equal precedence on the calendar is granted by law.

(d) For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:

- (1) “Local agency” means a city, town, county, or city and county, or a district, public authority, or any other political subdivision in the state.
- (2) “Resident” means a person who lives, works, owns property, or attends school in the jurisdiction of the defendant local agency.”

Code Civ. Proc., § 1060 states, in relevant part:

“Any person interested under a written instrument, excluding a will or a trust, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, [. . .] may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract. He or she may ask for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief; and the

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court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed at the time. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and the declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. The declaration may be had before there has been any breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is sought.”

“To qualify for declaratory relief, [Plaintiff] would have to demonstrate its action presented two essential elements: “(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to [Plaintiff’s] rights or obligations.... But even assuming that [Plaintiff’s] action satisfies the first requirement, it must still present an ‘actual controversy.’ The ‘actual controversy’ language in Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 encompasses a probable future controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties. It does not embrace controversies that are conjectural, anticipated to occur in the future, or an attempt to obtain an advisory opinion from the court. Thus, while a party may seek declaratory judgment before an actual invasion of rights has occurred, it must still demonstrate that the controversy is justiciable. And to be justiciable, the controversy must be ripe.” *Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City* (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1582 (internal citations and quotations omitted; emphasis in original). “The court may refuse to exercise the power granted by this chapter in any case where its declaration or determination is not necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.” Code Civ. Proc., § 1061.

“[T]he CPRA provides the exclusive remedy for resolving whether a public entity has erroneously refused to disclose a particular record or class of records. Nowhere in the CPRA is there any language that explicitly or implicitly restricts, permits, or precludes any type of legal action “concerning” public records other than whether a particular record or class of records must be disclosed. The CPRA’s judicial remedy is limited to a requestor’s action to determine whether a particular record or class of records must be disclosed. The purpose of the CPRA is furthered, not obstructed, by citizen suits under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a to enforce the CPRA’s provisions.” *County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 119, 130 (emphasis in original).

“Moreover, section 526a makes plaintiffs eligible to seek a range of remedies beyond mandamus. (See, e.g., *Love v. Keays* (1971) 6 Cal.3d 339, 343, 98 Cal.Rptr. 811, 491 P.2d 395 [declaratory and injunctive relief][.]” *Weatherford v. City of San Rafael* (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1249. “Injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action.” *Guessous v. Chrome Hearts, LLC* (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1187. The Court will treat the fourth “cause of action” as a remedy for purposes of Section 526a.

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Petitioner/Plaintiff (hereafter "Plaintiff") met its burden to show that Plaintiff's causes of action have merit by showing that each element of the causes of action can be established and that there is no defense thereto. Defendant has not met his burden to provide specific facts to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the causes of action. CCP § 437c(p)(1).

Plaintiffs have established systematic violations of the CPRA. Plaintiffs show that Defendants failed to meet the ten-day deadline set forth in Gov. Code § 7922.535. (Plaintiff's Separate Statement of Facts and Supporting Evidence ["UMF"], 9, 10.) Defendants also failed to provide all the required information necessary under Section 7922.535. (UMF, at 12, 14.) Defendants also withheld documents beyond the 18-month time frame without a determination of meeting the factors for withholding under Penal Code 832.7(b). (UMF, at 12, 81, 141.) Defendants failed to provide the written updates necessary under Section 832.7(b). (UMF, at 17, 23.)

Plaintiffs have also demonstrated that Defendants routinely failed to provide any documents at all to certain requestors. (UMF, at 9, 22.) In addition, at times, when production is made the disclosure is incomplete. (Id. at 57, 58, 162-165.) Also, on numerous occasions, Defendants violated the time frames for disclosure of records set forth in the CPRA. (Id. at 15, 16, 18, 71, 156.) Occasionally, Defendants made a response that no records exist without making a reasonable attempt to obtain the records, and, later, other information will arise to establish that the documents exist. (Id. at 74-76.) Plaintiffs establish that Defendants have failed to enact adequate staffing and policies to ensure with compliance with Section 832.7 including digital recordkeeping. (UMF, 20-33.)

In opposition, Defendants have not meaningfully disputed these facts with competent evidence. Defendants initial argument is that a recent case, *Di Lauro v. City of Burbank* (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 969, precludes this action altogether since *DiLauro* held that class actions are not permitted to pursue CPRA claims. However, *Di Lauro* is distinguishable because the instant action is not a class action. In addition, *Di Lauro* did not involve a claim under CCP § 526a. Defendants make reference to numerous individuals who are purportedly part of the "class," but the Court notes that none of these individuals are named as parties in the Second Amended Petition. Petitioner is not precluded from including evidence of other individuals who met with similar violations of the CPRA without transforming this action into a class action.

Defendants also argue that the remedy sought is not allowed under the CPRA. However, the Court notes that the only cause of action left remaining is the one under CCP § 526a. As noted in the authorities listed above, injunctive relief is clearly a remedy that can be obtained in such a cause of action. "Furthermore, it has never been the rule in this state that the parties in suits

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Deputy Sheriff: None

under section 526a must have a personal interest in the litigation. We specifically stated in *Crowe v. Boyle*, supra., 184 Cal. 117, 152 that ‘no showing of special damage to the particular taxpayer has been held necessary.’” *Blair v. Pitchess* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 269–270.

Defendants also attempt to distinguish *County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 119, and attempt to argue that the relief sought by Plaintiff is not available because Plaintiff has attempted to misapply the holding of that case. However, in fact, *County of Santa Clara* is quite similar to the instant action and provides authority for pursuing a taxpayer action under Section 526a for violations of the CPRA. Notably, the *County of Santa Clara Court* held that a cause of action for Section 526a was properly alleged when the Plaintiff alleged facts that Defendants “[failed] to respond to lawful requests to inspect or copy public records in a timely fashion[.]” *County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 119, 131.

Defendants also urge the Court to deny the motion because granting the motion would create “bad policy” because not every person mentioned in the evidence submitted by Plaintiff regarding Defendants’ failure to comply with the CPRA brought this litigation. However, the Court determines that, in fact, public policy would be fostered by enforcing the CPRA even to other individuals who may have not been named in this lawsuit but were otherwise affected by the actions of the Defendants.

Finally, the Court notes that, in regard to the evidence submitted by Defendants, even disregarding Plaintiffs’ contention that certain evidence was withheld during discovery but only now revealed in opposition to the motion, while Defendants’ evidence can show disputes as to certain aspects of Plaintiffs’ contentions, it does not, in fact, provide material facts to show that the systematic violations noted by Plaintiffs did not, in fact, occur.

Gov. Code, § 7922.545 states:

“(a) In addition to maintaining public records for public inspection during its office hours, a public agency may comply with Section 7922.525 by posting any public record on its internet website and, in response to a request for a public record posted on the internet website, directing a member of the public to the location on the internet website where the public record is posted. (b) However, if after the public agency directs a member of the public to the internet website, the member of the public requesting the public record requests a copy of the public record due to an inability to access or reproduce the public record from the internet website, the public agency shall promptly provide a copy of the public record pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 7922.530.”

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Civil Division

Southwest District, Torrance Courthouse, Department M

21STCP04167

**AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA vs INGLEWOOD POLICE DEPARTMENT**

November 20, 2025

2:43 PM

Judge: Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka

Judicial Assistant: J. Ahn

Courtroom Assistant: None

CSR: None

ERM: None

Deputy Sheriff: None

The Court holds that Plaintiff has adequately established that they are entitled to the remedy set forth under Section 7922.545. The Court hereby limits the time for compliance with Section 7922.545 to a period of three (3) years from this date.

Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted.

Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of this ruling.

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Trisha Shanklin, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California on 08/21/2025 is Granted.

Plaintiffs to submit a proposed judgment on or before date shown below.

Status Conference Re: Status of Proposed Judgment is scheduled for 2/4/2026 at 08:30 AM in Department M at Torrance Courthouse.

On the Court's own motion, the Hearing on Motion - Other For Injunctive Relief scheduled for 02/04/2026 is advanced to this date and vacated.

Certificate of Service is attached.